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#### Obama has the upper hand on debt limit now but GOP demands could create a complicated battle

Kapur, 9/9 --- TPM’s senior congressional reporter and Supreme Court correspondent

(9/9/2013, Sahil, “Is House GOP Backing Down In Debt Limit Fight?” <http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/09/house-gop-cantor-memo-debt-ceiling-cr-sequester-immigration.php>)

House Republicans are taming members’ expectations ahead of the debt limit showdown, signaling that they may not be able to extract significant concessions from Democrats.

A Friday memo to GOP members by Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) says “the House will act to prevent a default on our obligations before” the mid-October deadline the Obama administration has established. “House Republicans,” he says, “will demand fiscal reforms and pro-growth policies which put us on a path to balance in ten years in exchange for another increase in the debt limit.”

The language is vague — intentionally so, in order to maintain wiggle room for Republicans to avert a disastrous debt default. President Barack Obama has vowed not to pay a ransom to ensure the U.S. can meet its obligations.

If and when they do cave, Republicans will be hard-pressed to show their base they got something in return for raising the debt ceiling. In January, they got Senate Democrats to agree to pass a non-binding budget resolution. This time around, the possibilities for symbolic concessions range from a doomed Senate vote to delay or defund Obamacare or instructions to initiate the process of tax reform.

There are a number of demands rank-and-file Republicans have urged leaders to make which could genuinely complicate the battle, such as dollar-for-dollar spending cuts or unwinding Obamacare. Cantor’s memo mentioned neither. GOP members have also called on leadership not to bring up any debt limit bill that lacks the support of half the conference. Boehner hasn’t committed to this and Cantor didn’t mention it in his memo.

There are several reasons Republicans will have a hard time extracting concessions. Back in January, when Obama held firm and refused to negotiate on the debt limit, Republicans folded and agreed to suspend the debt ceiling without substantial concessions but rather symbolic ones. And due to deep divisions within the conference, House Republicans will face enormous challenges in rounding up 218 votes to pass any conceivable debt limit hike.

The party’s top priority is to cut safety-net programs like Social Security and Medicare. But there’s no internal consensus on what to cut. And Republicans, whose constituents are disproportionately older, have generally refused to vote on entitlement cuts without bipartisan cover from Democrats. In this case Democrats are highly unlikely to give it to them, which complicates their task of passing a debt limit bill.

The Cantor memo makes it all but official that Republicans won’t seek to defund Obamacare in the fiscal battles. The strategy, pushed by conservative activists, to withhold support for keeping the government running after Sept. 30 unless Democrats agree to defund Obamacare. Instead it vows to “hold a series of strategic votes throughout the fall to dismantle, defund, and delay Obamacare.” The memo says Republicans “will continue to pursue the strategy of systematically derailing this train wreck and replacing it with a patient-centered system.”

The GOP’s big stand in the fiscal battles will be to force Obama to accept the lower spending levels ordered by sequestration — automatic spending cuts enacted in 2011 — in a measure to keep the government funded. Here Republicans will refuse to cede and the White House has not suggested it’ll veto a bill that maintains sequester spending levels, although Obama wants to cut a deal to replace the sequester.

“In signing a CR at sequester levels,” Cantor writes, “the President would be endorsing a level of spending that wipes away all the increases he and Congressional Democrats made while they were in charge and returns us to a pre-2008 level of discretionary spending.”

#### Political capital is finite --- the plan burns up limited leverage with House Republicans

Moore, 9/10 --- Guardian's US finance and economics editor

(Heidi, 9/10/2013, “Syria: the great distraction; Obama is focused on a conflict abroad, but the fight he should be gearing up for is with Congress on America's economic security,” [http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester)](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester%29))

Before President Obama speaks to the nation about Syria tonight, take a look at what this fall will look like inside America.¶ There are 49 million people in the country who suffered inadequate access to food in 2012, leaving the percentage of "food-insecure" Americans at about one-sixth of the US population. At the same time, Congress refused to pass food-stamp legislation this summer, pushing it off again and threatening draconian cuts.¶ The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short.¶ The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding.¶ Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon.¶ The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem.¶ These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria.¶ More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas.¶ The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect.¶ This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria.¶ Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad.¶ Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told:¶ Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure.¶ Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington.¶ Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.¶The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today.¶ It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria.¶ There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.

**Failure to reach a deal guarantees government shutdown.**

**Farry, 1-19-2011**

[Yanira, Junior Editor – Veterans Today, Military & Foreign Affairs Journal, “GOP-Tea Party Play Chicken With U.S. Credit, Courting Catastrophe,” http://www.veteranstoday.com/2011/01/19/gop-tea-party-play-chicken-with-u-s-credit-courting-catastrophe/]

SHUTTING DOWN GOVERNMENT: If the debt limit is reached, the government is forced to move to a purely cash-flow budget, paying bills with only the tax revenue that comes in. Interest payments on the debt would get paid first, but what is the order of payment after that? Government activities that could fail to be funded range from Social Security and Medicare to military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 1995-96, when House Republicans, led by then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich, refused to raise the debt ceiling for a short time, it caused “two temporary shutdowns of all ‘nonessential’ federal government activities, including a cessation of toxic waste cleanups, disease control activities, and a suspension of many law enforcement and drug control operations,” ultimately costing the U.S. taxpayer more than $800 million. The Clinton Treasury Department was required to employ some creative accounting — “including a temporary use of retirement funds for former government employees” — to stave off even worse outcomes. Analysts at Deutsche Bank have found that such efforts would not work as well today, and the government would “not be able to stave off a government shutdown (or possible suspension of bond payments) for long” if the debt ceiling isn’t raised. But still, some Republicans, such as former Minnesota governor Tim Pawlenty (R), have said this is the route Congress should choose. As Austan Goolsbee, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers put it, “If we get to the point where we damage the full faith and credit of the United States, that would be the first default in history caused purely by insanity.”

**That causes cyberattacks.**

**Sideman, 2-23-2011**

[Alysha, Federal Computer Week Contributor, “Agencies must determine computer security teams in face of potential federal shutdown” http://fcw.com/Articles/2011/02/23/Agencies-must-determine-computer-security-teams-in-face-of-shutdown.aspx?Page=1]

With the WikiLeaks hacks and other threats to cybersecurity present, guarding against cyberattacks has become a significant part of governing -- especially because most government agencies have moved to online systems. As a potential government shutdown comes closer, agencies must face new questions about defining “essential” computer personnel. Cyber threats weren’t as significant during the 1995 furlough as they are today, reports NextGov. The publication adds that agencies need to buck up and be organized. In late January, government officials, NATO and the European Union banded together in Brussels to formulate a plan to battle cyber bandits, according to Defense Systems. Leaders there agreed that existing cybersecurity measures were incomplete and decided to fast-track a new plan for cyber incident response. Meanwhile, observers are wondering whether the U.S. government has a plan to deal with cyberattacks in the case of a shutdown. The lists of essential computer security personnel drawn up 15 years ago are irrelevant today, computer specialists told NextGov. In 1995, the only agencies concerned about cybersecurity were entities such as the FBI and CIA. Today, before any potential government shutdown happens, a plan of essential IT personnel should be determined, the specialists add. Agencies should be figuring out which systems will need daily surveillance and strategic defense, as well as evaluating the job descriptions of the people operating in those systems, former federal executives told NextGov. Hord Tipton, a former Interior Department CIO, agrees. “If they haven’t done it, there’s going to be a mad scramble, and there’s going to be a hole in the system,” he told the site. All government departments are supposed to have contingency plans on deck that spell out essential systems and the employees associated with them, according to federal rules. Meanwhile, some experts say determining which IT workers are essential depends more on the length of the shutdown. Jeffrey Wheatman, a security and privacy analyst with the Gartner research group, tells NextGov that a shutdown lasting a couple of weeks “would require incident response personnel, network administrators and staff who monitor firewall logs for potential intrusions.” If a shutdown lasted a month or longer, more employees would need to report, he said, adding: “New threats could emerge during that time frame, which demands people with strategy-oriented job functions to devise new lines of defense.” Employees who are deemed “essential” are critical to national security. Cyber warfare or holes in cybersecurity can threaten a nation’s infrastructure. In particular, the electric grid, the nation’s military assets, financial sector and telecommunications networks can be vulnerable in the face of an attack, reports Federal Computer Week.

**Great power escalation.**

**Fritz, 2009**

[Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international relations at Bond University, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” July, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.pdf]

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. **This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves.** This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. **A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own**, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.

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#### Interpretation –

#### Introduction of “United States Armed Forces” only means personnel

Eric Lorber – January 2013, EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science, JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vol. 15:3 , https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013

As discussed above, critical to the application of the War Powers Resolution—especially in the context of an offensive cyber operation—are the definitions of key terms, particularly “armed forces,” as the relevant provisions of the Act are only triggered if the President “introduc[es armed forces] into hostilities or into situations [of] imminent . . . hostilities,”172 or if such forces are introduced “into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces.”173 The requirements may also be triggered if the United States deploys armed forces “in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.”174 As is evident, the definition of “armed forces” is crucial to deciphering whether the WPR applies in a particular circumstance to provide congressional leverage over executive actions. The definition of “hostilities,” which has garnered the majority of scholarly and political attention,175 particularly in the recent Libyan conflict,176 will be dealt with secondarily here because it only becomes important if “armed forces” exist in the situation. As is evident from a textual analysis,177 an examination of the legislative history,178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act,179 “armed forces” refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define “armed forces,” but it states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government.”180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase “introduction of armed forces,” the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term “member” connotes a human individual who is part of an organization.181 Thus, it appears that the term “armed forces” means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces.”182 By using inclusionary—as opposed to exclusionary— language, one might argue that the term “armed forces” could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as nonmembers constituting armed forces).183 Second, the term “member” does not explicitly reference “humans,” and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that “armed forces” refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.

#### Violation – the Aff includes weapons systems / other non-human capabilities

#### Vote Neg –

**Extra topical – impossible to predict infinite number of things they could add on to the plan**

#### Predictable limits – The United States has hundreds of different weapons systems that could be deployed by any of the 4 services across over 200 countries – These include nukes, which was its own entire topic 4 years ago

#### Ground – Deploying troops is the core question of the president’s war power because it puts troops in harm’s way – there’s no disadvantage to repositioning a forward-deployed systems

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#### The Executive branch of the United States federal government should restrict the President’s authority to introduce weapons into space hostilities and implement this through self-binding mechanisms including, but not limited to independent commissions to review and ensure compliance with the order and transparency measures that gives journalists access to White House decisionmaking.

#### Including self-binding mechanisms ensures effective constraints and executive credibility

Posner & Vermeule, 6 --- \*Prof of Law at U Chicago, AND \*\* Prof of Law at Harvard (9/19/2006, Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, “The Credible Executive,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931501)>)

IV. Executive Signaling: Law and Mechanisms¶ We suggest that the executive’s credibility problem can be solved by second-order mechanisms of executive signaling. In the general case, well-motivated executives send credible signals by taking actions that are more costly for ill-motivated actors than for well-motivated ones, thus distinguishing themselves from their ill-motivated mimics. Among the specific mechanisms we discuss, an important subset involve executive self-binding, whereby executives commit themselves to a course of action that would impose higher costs on ill-motivated actors. Commitments themselves have value as signals of benign motivations.¶This departs from the usual approach in legal scholarship. Legal theory has often discussed self-binding by “government” or government officials. In constitutional theory, it is often suggested that constitutions represent an attempt by “the people” to bind “themselves” against their own future decisionmaking pathologies, or relatedly that constitutional prohibitions represent mechanisms by which governments commit themselves not to expropriate investments or to exploit their populations.71 Whether or not this picture is coherent,72 it is not the question we examine here, although some of the relevant considerations are similar.73 We are not concerned with binding the president so that he cannot abuse his powers, but with how he might bind himself or take other actions that enhance his credibility, so that he can generate support from the public and other members of the government.¶ Furthermore, our question is subconstitutional; it is whether a well-motivated executive, acting within an established set of constitutional and statutory rules, can use signaling to generate public trust. Accordingly we proceed by assuming that no constitutional amendments or new statutes will be enacted. Within these constraints, what can a well-motivated executive do to bootstrap himself to credibility? The problem for the well-motivated executive is to credibly signal his benign motivations; in general, the solution is to engage in actions that are less costly for good types than for bad types.¶ We begin with some relevant law; then examine a set of possible mechanisms, emphasizing both the conditions under which they might succeed and the conditions under which they might not; and then examine the costs of credibility.¶ A. A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding¶ Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in particular, those that involve self-binding.74 Can a president bind himself to respect particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is “yes, at least to the same extent that a legislature can.” Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated, thereby establishing a new legal status quo.75 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical sense, presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules or policies.¶More schematically, we may speak of formal and informal means of self-binding:¶ (1) The president might use formal means to bind himself. This is possible in the sense that an executive order, if otherwise valid, legally binds the president while it is in effect and may be enforced by the courts. It is not possible in the sense that the president can always repeal the executive order if he can bear the political and reputational costs of doing so.¶ (2) The president might use informal means to bind himself. This is not only possible but frequent and important. Issuing an executive rule providing for the appointment of special prosecutors, as Nixon did, is not a formal self-binding.76 However, there may be large political costs to repealing the order. This effect does not depend on the courts’ willingness to enforce the order, even against Nixon himself. Court enforcement makes the order legally binding while it is in place, but only political and reputational enforcement can protect it from repeal. Just as a dessert addict might announce to his friends that he is going on a no-dessert diet in order to raise the reputational costs of backsliding and thus commit himself, so too the repeal of an executive order may be seen as a breach of faith even if no other institution ever enforces it.¶ In what follows, we will invoke both formal and informal mechanisms. For our purposes, the distinction between the authority to engage in de jure self-binding (legally limited and well-defined) and the power to engage in de facto self-binding (broad and amorphous) is secondary. So long as policies are deliberately chosen with a view to generating credibility, and do so by constraining the president’s own future choices in ways that impose greater costs on ill-motivated presidents than on well-motivated ones, it does not matter whether the constraint is formal or informal.¶ B. Mechanisms¶ What signaling mechanisms might a well-motivated executive adopt to credibly assure voters, legislators and judges that his policies rest on judgments about the public interest, rather than on power-maximization, partisanship or other nefarious motives? Intrabranch separation of powers. In an interesting treatment of related problems, Neal Katyal suggests that the failure of the Madisonian system counsels “internal separation of powers” within the executive branch.77 Abdication by Congress means that there are few effective checks on executive power; second-best substitutes are necessary. Katyal proposes some mechanisms that would be adopted by Congress, such as oversight hearings by the minority party, but his most creative proposals are for arrangements internal to the executive branch, such as redundancy and competition among agencies, stronger civil-service protections and internal adjudication of executive controversies by insulated “executive” decisionmakers who resemble judges in many ways.78Katyal’s argument is relevant because the mechanisms he discusses might be understood as signaling devices, but his overall approach is conceptually flawed, on two grounds. First, the assumption that second-best constraints on the executive should reproduce the Madisonian separation of powers within the executive branch is never defended. The idea seems to be that this is as close as we can get to the first-best, while holding constant everything else in our constitutional order. But the general theory of second-best states that approaching as closely as possible to the first-best will not necessarily be the preferred strategy;79 the best approach may be to adjust matters on other margins as well, in potentially unpredictable ways. If the Madisonian system has failed in the ways Katyal suggests, the best compensating adjustment might be, for all we know, to switch to a parliamentary system. (We assume that no large-scale changes of this sort are possible, whereas Katyal seemingly assumes that they are, or at least does not make clear his assumptions in this regard). Overall, Katyal’s view has a kind of fractal quality – each branch should reproduce within itself the very same separation of powers structure that also describes the whole system – but it is not explained why the constitutional order should be fractal.¶ Second, Katyal’s proposals for internal separation of powers are self-defeating: the motivations that Katyal ascribes to the executive are inconsistent with the executive adopting or respecting the prescriptions Katyal recommends.80 Katyal never quite says so explicitly, but he clearly envisions the executive as a power-maximizing actor, in the sense that the president seeks to remove all constraints on his current choices.81 Such an executive would not adopt or enforce the internal separation of powers to check himself. Executive signaling is not, even in principle, a solution to the lack of constraints on a power-maximizing executive in the sense Katyal implicitly intends. Although an illmotivated executive might bind himself to enhance his strategic credibility, as explained above, he would not do so in order to restore the balance of powers. Nor is it possible, given Katyal’s premise of legislative passivity or abdication, that Congress would force the internal separation of powers on the executive. In what follows, we limit ourselves to proposals that are consistent with the motivations, beliefs, and political opportunities that we ascribe to the well-motivated executive, to whom the proposals are addressed. This limitation ensures that the proposals are not self-defeating, whatever their costs.¶ The contrast here must not be drawn too simply. A well-motivated executive, in our sense, might well attempt to increase his power. The very point of demonstrating credibility is to encourage voters and legislators to increase the discretionary authority of the executive, where all will be made better off by doing so. Scholars such as Katyal who implicitly distrust the executive, however, do not subscribe to this picture of executive motivations. Rather, they see the executive as an unfaithful agent of the voters; the executive attempts to maximize his power even where fully-informed voters would prefer otherwise. An actor of that sort will have no incentive to adopt proposals intended to constrain that sort of actor.¶ Independent commissions. We now turn to some conceptually coherent mechanisms of executive signaling. Somewhat analogously to Katyal’s idea of the internal separation of powers, a well-motivated executive might establish independent commissions to review policy decisions, either before or after the fact. Presidents do this routinely, especially after a policy has had disastrous outcomes, but sometimes beforehand as well. Independent commissions are typically blue-ribbon and bipartisan.82¶ We add to this familiar process the idea that the President might gain credibility by publicly committing or binding himself to give the commission authority on some dimension. The president might publicly promise to follow the recommendations of such a commission, or to allow the commission to exercise de facto veto power over a policy decision before it is made, or might promise before the policy is chosen that the commission will be given power to review its success after the fact. To be sure, there will always be some wiggle room in the terms of the promise, but that is true of almost all commitments, which raise the costs of wiggling out even if they do not completely prevent it.¶ Consider whether George W. Bush’s credibility would have been enhanced had he appointed a blue-ribbon commission to examine the evidence for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and publicly promised not to invade unless the commission found substantial evidence of their existence. Bush would have retained his preexisting legal authority to order the invasion even if the commission found the evidence inadequate, but the political costs of doing so would have been large. Knowing this, and knowing that Bush shared that knowledge, the public could have inferred that Bush’s professed motive – elimination of weapons of mass destruction – was also his real motive. Public promises that inflict reputational costs on badly motivated behavior help the well-motivated executive to credibly distinguish himself from the ill-motivated one.¶ The more common version of this tactic is to appoint commissions after the relevant event, as George W. Bush did to investigate the faulty reports by intelligence agencies that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.83 If the president appoints after-the-fact commissions, the commissions can enhance his credibility for the next event—by showing that he will be willing, after that event, to subject his statements to scrutiny by public experts. Here, however, the demonstration of credibility is weaker, because there is no commitment to appoint any after-the-fact commissions in the future – merely a plausible inference that the president’s future behavior will track his past behavior.¶ Bipartisan appointments. In examples of the sort just mentioned, the signaling arises from public position-taking. The well-motivated executive might produce similar effects through appointments to office.84 A number of statutes require partisan balance on multimember commissions; although these statutes are outside the scope of our discussion, we note that presidents might approve them because they allow the president to commit to a policy that legislators favor, thus encouraging legislators to increase the scope of the delegation in the first place.85 For similar reasons, presidents may consent to restrictions on the removal of agency officials, because the restriction enables the president to commit to giving the agency some autonomy from the president’s preferences.86¶ Similar mechanisms can work even where no statutes are in the picture. As previously mentioned, during World War II, FDR appointed Republicans to important cabinet positions, making Stimson his Secretary of War. Clinton appointed William Cohen, a moderate Republican, as Secretary of Defense in order to shore up his credibility on security issues. Bipartisanship of this sort might improve the deliberation that precedes decisions, by impeding various forms of herding, cascades and groupthink;87 however, we focus on its credibility-generating effects. By (1) expanding the circle of those who share the president’s privileged access to information, (2) ensuring that policy is partly controlled by officials with preferences that differ from the president’s, and (3) inviting a potential whistleblower into the tent, bipartisanship helps to dispel the suspicion that policy decisions rest on partisan motives or extreme preferences, which in turn encourages broader delegations of discretion from the public and Congress.¶ A commitment to bipartisanship is only one way in which appointments can generate credibility. Presidents might simply appoint a person with a reputation for integrity, as when President Nixon appointed Archibald Cox as special prosecutor (although plausibly Nixon did so because he was forced to do so by political constraints, rather than as a tactic for generating credibility). A person with well-known preferences on a particular issue, even if not of the other party or widely respected for impartiality, can serve as a credible whistleblower on that issue. Thus presidents routinely award cabinet posts to leaders of subsets of the president’s own party, leaders whose preferences are known to diverge from the president’s on the subject; one point of this is to credibly assure the relevant interest groups that the president will not deviate (too far) from their preferences.¶ The Independent Counsel Statute institutionalized the special prosecutor and strengthened it. But the statute proved unpopular and was allowed to lapse in 1999.88 This experience raises two interesting questions. First, why have presidents confined themselves to appointing lawyers to investigate allegations of wrongdoing; why have they not appointed, say, independent policy experts to investigate allegations of policy failure? Second, why did the Independent Counsel Statute fail? Briefly, the statute failed because it was too difficult to control the behavior of the prosecutor, who was not given any incentive to keep his investigation within reasonable bounds.89 Not surprisingly, policy investigators would be even less constrained since they would not be confined by the law, and at the same time, without legal powers they would probably be ignored on partisan grounds. A commission composed of members with diverse viewpoints is harder to ignore, if the members agree with each other.¶ More generally, the decision by presidents to bring into their administrations members of other parties, or persons with a reputation for bipartisanship and integrity, illustrates the formation of domestic coalitions of the willing. Presidents can informally bargain around the formal separation of powers90 by employing subsets of Congress, or of the opposing party, to generate credibility while maintaining a measure of institutional control. FDR was willing to appoint Knox and Stimson, but not to give the Republicans in Congress a veto. Truman was willing to ally with Arthur Vandenbergh but not with all the Republicans; Clinton was willing to appoint William Cohen but not Newt Gingrich. George W. Bush likewise made a gesture towards credibility by briefing members of the Senate Intelligence Committee – including Democrats – on the administration’s secret surveillance program(s), which provided a useful talking point when the existence of the program(s) was revealed to the public.¶ Counter-partisanship. Related to bipartisanship is what might be called counterpartisanship: presidents have greater credibility when they choose policies that cut against the grain of their party’s platform or their own presumed preferences.91 Only Nixon could go to China, and only Clinton could engineer welfare reform. Voters and publics rationally employ a political heuristic: the relevant policy, which voters are incapable of directly assessing, must be highly beneficial if it is chosen by a president who is predisposed against it by convictions or partisan loyalty.92 Accordingly, those who wish to move U.S. terrorism policy towards greater security and less liberty might do well to support the election of a Democrat.93 By the same logic, George W. Bush is widely suspected of nefarious motives when he rounds up alleged enemy combatants, but not when he creates a massive prescription drug benefit.¶ Counter-partisanship can powerfully enhance the president’s credibility, but it depends heavily on a lucky alignment of political stars. A peace-loving president has credibility when he declares a military emergency but not when he appeases; a belligerent president has credibility when he offers peace but not when he advocates military solutions. A lucky nation has a well-motivated president with a belligerent reputation when international tensions diminish (Ronald Reagan) and a president with a pacific reputation when they grow (Abraham Lincoln, who opposed the Mexican War). But a nation is not always lucky.¶ Transparency. The well-motivated executive might commit to transparency, as a way to reduce the costs to outsiders of monitoring his actions.94 The FDR strategy of inviting potential whistleblowers from the opposite party into government is a special case of this; the implicit threat is that the whistleblower will make public any evidence of partisan motivations. The more ambitious case involves actually exposing the executive’s decisionmaking processes to observation. To the extent that an ill-motivated executive cannot publicly acknowledge his motivations or publicly instruct subordinates to take them into account in decisionmaking, transparency will exclude those motivations from the decisionmaking process. The public will know that only a well-motivated executive would promise transparency in the first place, and the public can therefore draw an inference to credibility.¶Credibility is especially enhanced when transparency is effected through journalists with reputations for integrity or with political preferences opposite to those of the president. Thus George W. Bush gave Bob Woodward unprecedented access to White House decisionmaking, and perhaps even to classified intelligence,95 with the expectation that the material would be published. This sort of disclosure to journalists is not real-time transparency – no one expects meetings of the National Security Council to appear on CSPAN – but the anticipation of future disclosure can have a disciplining effect in the present. By inviting this disciplining effect, the administration engages in signaling in the present through (the threat of) future transparency.¶There are complex tradeoffs here, because transparency can have a range of harmful effects. As far as process is concerned, decisionmakers under public scrutiny may posture for the audience, may freeze their views or positions prematurely, and may hesitate to offer proposals or reasons for which they can later be blamed if things go wrong.96 As for substance, transparency can frustrate the achievement of programmatic or policy goals themselves. Where security policy is at stake, secrecy is sometimes necessary to surprise enemies or to keep them guessing. Finally, one must take account of the incentives of the actors who expose the facts—especially journalists who might reward presidents who give them access by portraying their decisionmaking in a favorable light.97¶ We will take up the costs of credibility shortly.98 In general, however, the existence of costs does not mean that the credibility-generating mechanisms are useless. Quite the contrary: where the executive uses such mechanisms, voters and legislators can draw an inference that the executive is well-motivated, precisely because the existence of costs would have given an ill-motivated executive an excuse not to use those mechanisms.¶Multilateralism. Another credibility-generating mechanism for the executive is to enter into alliances or international institutions that subject foreign policy decisions to multilateral oversight. Because the information gap between voters and legislators, on the one hand, and the executive on the other is especially wide in foreign affairs, there is also wide scope for suspicion and conspiracy theories. If the president undertakes a unilateral foreign policy, some sectors of the domestic public will be suspicious of his motives. All recent presidents have faced this problem. In the case of George W. Bush, as we suggested, many have questioned whether the invasion of Iraq was undertaken to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, or to protect human rights, or instead to safeguard the oil supply, or because the president has (it is alleged) always wanted to invade Iraq because Saddam Hussein ordered the assassination of his father. In the case of Bill Clinton, some said that the cruise missile attack on Osama bin Laden’s training camp in Afghanistan was a “wag the dog” tactic intended to distract attention from Clinton’s impeachment.¶ A public commitment to multilateralism can close or narrow the credibility gap.¶ Suppose that a group of nations have common interests on one dimension – say, security from terrorism or from proliferation of nuclear weapons – but disparate interests on other dimensions – say, conflicting commercial or political interests. Multilateralism can be understood as a policy that in effect requires a supermajority vote, or even unanimity, among the group to license intervention. The supermajority requirement ensures that only interventions promoting the security interest common to the group will be approved, while interventions that promote some political agenda not shared by the requisite supermajority will be rejected. Knowing this, domestic audiences can infer that interventions that gain multilateral approval do not rest on disreputable motives.¶ It follows that multilateralism can be either formal or informal. Action by the United Nations Security Council can be taken only under formal voting rules that require unanimity. Informally, in the face of increasing tensions with Iran, George W. Bush’s policy has been extensive multilateral consultations and a quasi-commitment not to intervene unilaterally. Knowing that his credibility is thin after Iraq, Bush has presumably adopted this course in part to reassure domestic audiences that there is no nefarious motive behind an intervention, should one occur.¶ It also follows that multilateralism and bipartisan congressional authorization may be substitutes, in terms of generating credibility. In both cases the public knows that the cooperators – partisan opponents or other nations, as the case may be – are unlikely to share any secret agenda the president may have. The substitution is only partial, however; as we suggested in Part III, the Madisonian emphasis on bipartisan authorization has proven insufficient. The interests of parties within Congress diverge less than do the interests of different nations, which makes the credibility gain greater under multilateralism. In eras of unified government, the ability of the president’s party to put a policy through Congress without the co-operation of the other party (ignoring the threat of a Senate filibuster, a weapon that the minority party often hesitates to wield) often undermines the policy’s credibility even if members of the minority go along; after all, the minority members may be going along precisely because they anticipate that opposition is fruitless, in which case no inference about the policy’s merits should be drawn from their approval. Moreover, even a well-motivated president may prefer, all else equal, to generate credibility through mechanisms that do not involve Congress, if concerned about delay, leaks, or obstruction by small legislative minorities. Thus Truman relied on a resolution of the United Nations Security Council rather than congressional authorization to prosecute the Korean War.99¶ The costs of multilateralism are straightforward. Multilateralism increases the costs of reaching decisions, because a larger group must coordinate its actions, and increases the risks of false negatives – failure to undertake justified interventions. A president who declines to bind himself through multilateralism may thus be either illmotivated and desirous of pursuing an agenda not based on genuine security goals, or well-motivated and worried about the genuine costs of multilateralism. As usual, however, the credibility-generating inference holds asymmetrically: precisely because an ill-motivated president may use the costs of multilateralism as a plausible pretext, a president who does pursue multilateralism is more likely to be well-motivated. ¶ Strict liability. For completeness, we mention that the well-motivated executive might in principle subject himself to strict liability for actions or outcomes that only an ill-motivated executive would undertake. Consider the controversy surrounding George W. Bush’s telecommunications surveillance program, which the president has claimed covers only communications in which one of the parties is overseas; domestic-to-domestic calls are excluded.100 There is widespread suspicion that this claim is false.101 In a recent poll, 26% of respondents believed that the National Security Agency listens to their calls.102 The credibility gap arises because it is difficult in the extreme to know what exactly the Agency is doing, and what the costs and benefits of the alternatives are.¶ Here the credibility gap might be narrowed by creating a cause of action, for damages, on behalf of anyone who can show that domestic-to-domestic calls were examined.103 Liability would be strict, because a negligence rule – did the Agency exert reasonable efforts to avoid examining the communication? – requires too much information for judges, jurors, and voters to evaluate, and would just reproduce the monitoring problems that gave rise to the credibility gap in the first place. Strict liability, by contrast, would require a much narrower factual inquiry. Crucially, a commitment to strict liability would only be made by an executive who intended to minimize the incidence of (even unintentional and non-negligent) surveillance of purely domestic communications.¶ However, there are legal and practical problems here, perhaps insuperable ones. Legally, it is hardly clear that the president could, on his own authority, create a cause of action against himself or his agents to be brought in federal court. It is well within presidential authority to create executive commissions for hearing claims against the United States, for disbursing funds under benefit programs, and so on; but the problem here is that there might be no pot of money from which to fund damages. The so-called Judgment Fund, out of which damages against the executive are usually paid, is restricted to statutorily-specified lawsuits. If so, statutory authorization for the president to create the strict liability cause of action would be necessary, as we discuss shortly.104 Practically, it is unclear whether government agents can be forced to “internalize costs” through money damages in the way that private parties can, at least if the treasury is paying those damages.105 And if it is, voters may not perceive the connection between governmental action and subsequent payouts in any event.¶ The news conference. Presidents use news conferences to demonstrate their mastery of the details of policy. Many successful presidents, like FDR, conducted numerous such conferences.106 Ill-motivated presidents will not care about policy if their interest is just holding power for its own sake; thus, they would regard news conferences as burdensome and risky chores. The problem is that a well-motivated president does not necessarily care about details of policy, as opposed to its broad direction, and journalists might benefit by tripping up a president in order to score points. Reagan, for example, did not care about policy details, but is generally regarded as a successful president.107 To make Reagan look good, his handlers devoted considerable resources trying to prepare him for news conferences, resources that might have been better used in other ways.108¶ “Precommitment politics.”109 We have been surveying mechanisms that the wellmotivated executive can employ once in office. However, in every case the analysis can be driven back one stage to the electoral campaign for executive office. During electoral campaigns, candidates for the presidency take public positions that partially commit them to subsequent policies, by raising the reputational costs of subsequent policy changes. Under current law, campaign promises are very difficult to enforce in the courts.110 But even without legal enforcement, position-taking helps to separate the well-motivated from the ill-motivated candidate, because the costs to the former of making promises of this sort are higher. To be sure, many such promises are vacuous, meaning that voters will not sanction a president who violates them, but some turn out to have real force, as George H.W. Bush discovered when he broke his clear pledge not to raise taxes.

### **1NC**

#### **asking how the executive should be allowed to conduct war masks the fundamental question of whether war should be allowed at all – ensures a military mentality**

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 22-23)

The widespread, unquestioning acceptance of warism and the corresponding reluctance to consider pacifism as a legitimate option make it difficult to propose a genuine consideration of pacifist alternatives. Warism may be held implicitly or explicitly. Held in its implicit form, it does not occur to the warist to challenge the view that war is morally justified; war is taken to be natural and normal. No other way of understanding large-scale human conflict even comes to mind. In this sense warism is like racism, sexism, and homophobia: a prejudicial bias built into conceptions and judgments without the awareness of those assuming it. In its explicit form, warism is openly accepted, articulated, and deliberately chosen as a value judgment on nations in conflict. War may be defended as essential for justice, needed for national security, as “the only thing the enemy understands,” and so on. In both forms warism misguides judgments and institutions by reinforcing the necessity and inevitability of war and precluding alternatives. Whether held implicitly or explicitly, warism obstructs questioning the conceptual framework of the culture. If we assume (without realizing it) that war itself is morally justifiable, our moral considerations of war will be focused on whether a particular war is justified or whether particular acts within a given war are morally acceptable. These are important concerns, but addressing them does not get at the fundamental issue raised by the pacifist: the morality of war as such. In Just and Unjust Wars Michael Walzer explains that “war is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt.”8 The pacifist suggestion is that there is a third judgment of war that must be made prior to the other two: might war, by its very nature, be morally wrong? This issue is considered by Walzer only as an afterthought in an appendix, where it is dismissed as naïve. Perhaps Walzer should not be faulted for this omission, since he defines his task as describing the conventional morality of war and, as has been argued above, conventional morality does take warism for granted. To this extent Walzer is correct. And this is just the point: our warist conceptual frameworks— our warist normative lenses— blind us to the root question. The concern of pacifists is to expose the hidden warist bias and not merely describe cultural values. Pacifists seek to examine cultural values and recommend what they ought to be. This is why the pacifist insists on judging war in itself, a judgment more fundamental than the more limited assessments of the morality of a given war or the morality of specific acts within a particular war.

#### this mindset is important – our consciousness of war guarantees endless violence that ensures planetary destruction and structural violence

Lawrence 9 (Grant, “Military Industrial "War" Consciousness Responsible for Economic and Social Collapse,” OEN—OpEdNews, March 27)

As a presidential candidate, [Barack Obama](http://obama.senate.gov/) called [Afghanistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29) ''the war we must win.'' He was absolutely right. Now it is time to win it... Senators [John McCain](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0564587/) and Joseph Lieberman [calling](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/inbox/story/960269.html) for an expanded war in Afghanistan "How true it is that war can destroy everything of value." Pope Benedict XVI [decrying](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuue8kE-e0lYZVFpt4RlbX4M_IEw) the suffering of Africa Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years. Lao Tzu on [War](http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/salt/salt09.htm) As Americans we are raised on the utility of war to conquer every problem. We have a drug problem so we wage war on it. We have a cancer problem so we wage war on it. We have a crime problem so we wage war on it. Poverty cannot be dealt with but it has to be warred against. Terror is another problem that must be warred against. In the [United States](http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667&spn=10.0,10.0&q=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667%20%28United%20States%29&t=h), solutions can only be found in terms of wars. In a society that functions to support a massive military industrial war machine and empire, it is important that the terms promoted support the conditioning of its citizens. We are conditioned to see war as the solution to major social ills and major political disagreements. That way when we see so much of our resources devoted to war then we don't question the utility of it. The term "war" excites mind and body and creates a fear mentality that looks at life in terms of attack. In war, there has to be an attack and a must win attitude to carry us to victory. But is this war mentality working for us? In an age when nearly half of our tax money goes to support the war machine and a good deal of the rest is going to support the elite that control the war machine, we can see that our present war mentality is not working. Our values have been so perverted by our war mentality that we see sex as sinful but killing as entertainment. Our society is dripping violence. The violence is fed by poverty, social injustice, the break down of family and community that also arises from economic injustice, and by the managed media. The cycle of violence that exists in our society exists because it is useful to those that control society. It is easier to sell the war machine when your population is conditioned to violence. Our military industrial consciousness may not be working for nearly all of the life of the planet but it does work for the very few that are the master manipulators of our values and our consciousness. Rupert Murdoch, the media monopoly man that runs the "Fair and Balanced" [Fox Network](http://www.fox.com/), Sky Television, and [News Corp](http://www.newscorp.com/) just to name a few, [had](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Murdoch) all of his 175 newspapers editorialize in favor of the [Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War). Murdoch snickers when [he says](http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=341) "we tried" to manipulate public opinion." The Iraq war was a good war to Murdoch [because,](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/07/b122948.html) "The death toll, certainly of Americans there, by the terms of any previous war are quite minute." But, to the media manipulators, the phony politicos, the military industrial elite, a million dead Iraqis are not to be considered. War is big business and it is supported by a war consciousness that allows it to prosper. That is why more war in Afghanistan, the war on Palestinians, and the other wars around the planet in which the [military industrial complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex) builds massive wealth and power will continue. The military industrial war mentality is not only killing, maiming, and destroying but it is also contributing to the present social and economic collapse. As mentioned previously, the massive wealth transfer that occurs when the American people give half of their money to support death and destruction is money that could have gone to support a just society. It is no accident that after years of war and preparing for war, our society is crumbling. Science and technological resources along with economic and natural resources have been squandered in the never-ending pursuit of enemies. All of that energy could have been utilized for the good of humanity, ¶ instead of maintaining the power positions of the very few super wealthy. So the suffering that we give is ultimately the suffering we get. Humans want to believe that they can escape the consciousness that they live in. But that consciousness determines what we experience and how we live. As long as we choose to live in "War" in our minds then we will continue to get "War" in our lives. When humanity chooses to wage peace on the world then there will be a flowering of life. But until then we will be forced to live the life our present war consciousness is creating.

#### The alternative must begin in our minds – we need to free ourselves of the presumption towards war and advocate for peace and social justice to stop the flow of militarism that threatens existence

Demenchonok 9 – Worked as a senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and is currently a Professor of Foreign Languages and Philosophy at Fort Valley State University in Georgia, listed in 2000 Outstanding Scholars of the 21st Century and is a recipient of the Twenty-First Century Award for Achievement in Philosophy from the International Biographical Centre --Edward, Philosophy After Hiroshima: From Power Politics to the Ethics of Nonviolence and Co-Responsibility, February, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Volume 68, Issue 1, Pages 9-49

Where, then, does the future lie? Unilateralism, hegemonic political anarchy, mass immiseration, ecocide, and global violence—a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes? Or international cooperation, social justice, and genuine collective—political and human—security? Down which path lies cowering, fragile hope?¶ Humanistic thinkers approach these problems from the perspective of their concern about the situation of individuals and the long-range interests of humanity. They examine in depth the root causes of these problems, warning about the consequences of escalation and, at the same time, indicating the prospect of their possible solutions through nonviolent means and a growing global consciousness. Today's world is in desperate need of realistic alternatives to violent conflict. Nonviolent action—properly planned and executed—is a powerful and effective force for political and social change. The ideas of peace and nonviolence, as expressed by Immanuel Kant, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many contemporary philosophers—supported by peace and civil rights movements—counter the paralyzing fear with hope and offer a realistic alternative: a rational approach to the solutions to the problems, encouraging people to be the masters of their own destiny.¶ Fortunately, the memory of the tragedies of war and the growing realization of this new existential situation of humanity has awakened the global conscience and generated protest movements demanding necessary changes. During the four decades of the Cold War, which polarized the world, power politics was challenged by the common perspective of humanity, of the supreme value of human life, and the ethics of peace. Thus, in Europe, which suffered from both world wars and totalitarianism, spiritual-intellectual efforts to find solutions to these problems generated ideas of "new thinking," aiming for peace, freedom, and democracy. Today, philosophers, intellectuals, progressive political leaders, and peace-movement activists continue to promote a peaceful alternative. In the asymmetry of power, despite being frustrated by war-prone politics, peaceful projects emerge each time, like a phoenix arising from the ashes, as the only viable alternative for the survival of humanity. The new thinking in philosophy affirms the supreme value of human and nonhuman life, freedom, justice, and the future of human civilization. It asserts that the transcendental task of the survival of humankind and the rest of the biotic community must have an unquestionable primacy in comparison to particular interests of nations, social classes, and so forth. In applying these principles to the nuclear age, it considers a just and lasting peace as a categorical imperative for the survival of humankind, and thus proposes a world free from nuclear weapons and from war and organized violence.44 In tune with the Charter of the United Nations, it calls for the democratization of international relations and for dialogue and cooperation in order to secure peace, human rights, and solutions to global problems. It further calls for the transition toward a cosmopolitan order.¶ The escalating global problems are symptoms of what might be termed a contemporary civilizational disease, developed over the course of centuries, in which techno-economic progress is achieved at the cost of depersonalization and dehumanization. Therefore, the possibility of an effective "treatment" today depends on whether or not humankind will be able to regain its humanity, thus establishing new relations of the individual with himself or herself, with others, and with nature. Hence the need for a new philosophy of humanity and an ethics of nonviolence and planetary co-responsibility to help us make sense not only of our past historical events, but also of the extent, quality, and urgency of our present choices.

### Weaponization

#### Space weaponization doesn’t cause crisis instability

Lambakis, Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, 2K1 (Steven, “Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics,” Policy Review, February 1, p. 41)

One such assumption is that military developments over the past 50 years have created a security environment in which certain tactical events or localized crises run an unacceptably high risk of triggering a general, possibly even nuclear, war. We are therefore more secure when we do nothing to upset the global military balance, especially in space -- where we station key stabilizing assets. Yet we have little experience in reality to ground this freely wielded and rather academic assumption. By definition, anything that causes instability in armed relationships is to be avoided. But would "shots" in space, any more than shots on the ground, be that cause? When we look at what incites war, history instructs us that what matter most are the character and motivation of the states involved, along with the general balance of power (i.e., are we in the world of 1914, 1945, or 2001?). Fluctuations in national arsenals, be they based on earth or in space, do not determine, but rather more accurately are a reflection of, the course of politics among nations. In other words, it matters not so much that there are nuclear weapons, but rather whether Saddam Hussein or Tony Blair controls them and in what security context. The same may be said for space weapons. The sway of major powers historically has regulated world stability. It follows that influential countries that support the rule of law and the right of all states to use orbits for nonaggressive purposes would help ensure stability in the age of satellites. The world is not more stable, in other words, if countries like the United States, a standard-bearer for such ideas, "do nothing." Washington's deterrence and engagement strategies would assume new dimensions with the added influence of space weapons, the presence of which could help bolster peacemaking diplomacy and prevent aggression on earth or in space. Insofar as we have no experience in space warfare, no cases exist to justify what is in essence a theoretically derived conclusion -- that space combat must be destabilizing. We do know, however, that the causes of war are rarely so uncomplicated. Small events, by themselves, seldom ever explain large-scale events. When ardent Israeli nationalist Ariel Sharon visited this past fall the holy site around the Al Aksa Mosque at Jerusalem's Temple Mount, his arrival fired up a series of riots among impassioned Palestinians and so widened the scale of violence that it kicked up the embers of regional war yet again. Yet the visit itself would have been inconsequential were it not for the inveterate hostility underlying Israeli-Palestinian relations. Likewise, World War I may have symbolically begun with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Yet a serious student of history would note that the alliances, the national goals and military plans, and the political, diplomatic, and military decisions of the major European powers during the preceding years and months were the true causes of the erosion in global strategic stability. By extension, if decisions to go to war are set on a hair-trigger, the reasons for the precarious circumstances extend far beyond whether a communications or imaging platform is destroyed in space rather than on earth. Those who believe we run extraordinary risks stemming from clouded perceptions and misunderstandings in an age of computerized space warfare might want to take a look at some real-world situations of high volatility in which potentially provocative actions took place. Take, for example, the tragedies involving the USS Stark and USS Vincennes. In May 1987, an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet fighter attacked the Stark on patrol to protect neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf, killing 37 sailors. Iraq, a "near-ally" of the United States at the time, had never before attacked a U.S. ship. Analysts concluded that misperception and faulty assumptions led to Iraq's errant attack. The memory of the USS Stark no doubt preoccupied the crew of the USS Vincennes, which little over a year later, in July 1988, was also on patrol in hostile Persian Gulf waters. The Vincennes crew was involved in a "half war" against Iran, and at the time was fending off surface attacks from small Iranian gunboats. Operating sophisticated technical systems under high stress and rules of engagement that allowed for anticipatory self-defense, the advanced Aegis cruiser fired anti-aircraft missiles at what it believed to be an Iranian military aircraft set on an attack course. The aircraft turned out to be a commercial Iran Air flight, and 290 people perished owing to mistakes in identification and communications. To these examples we may add a long list of tactical blunders growing Out of ambiguous circumstances and faulty intelligence, including the U.S. bombing in 1999 of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during Kosovo operations. Yet though these tragic actions occurred in near-war or tinderbox situations, they did not escalate or exacerbate local instability. The world also survived U.S.-Soviet "near encounters" during the 1948 Berlin crisis, the 1961 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Guarded diplomacy won the day in all cases. Why would disputes affecting space be any different? In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing -- so we are not always in the dark. The burden is on the critics, therefore, to present convincing analogical evidence to support the notion that, in wartime or peacetime, attempts by the United States to control space or exploit orbits for defensive or offensive purposes would increase significantly the chances for crisis instability or nuclear war. In Washington and other capitals, the historical pattern is to use every available means to clarify perceptions and to consider decisions that might lead to war or escalation with care, not dispatch.

#### Won’t go nuclear

Air Force Times 3-28-05 (Lawrence, “As Air Force presses to protect space assets, motives are proper”)

For some time there has been a flow of arguments against the Air Force's efforts to develop and promulgate space-control doctrine and systems, as well as criticism of senior officers' intentions and integrity. The Air Force is accused of overestimating the threat, overhyping systems and possessing a "trigger-happy" mentality that, if not immediately checked and cowed, would drag the United States into an unnecessary war. These incorrect and misguided arguments detract from the otherwise laudable goals of promulgating a space code of conduct and preventing an arms race in outer space. These arguments exhibit a fundamental misunderstanding of the Defense Department and its armed services as well as downplay the potential threat to U.S. space systems. Air Force detractors worry it is too concerned with the vulnerability of U.S. space assets and accuse senior officers of using hype in selling the need for space weapons. Of particular note is the charge that the service is pushing a worst-case/first-case scenario that any disruption of a space system is potentially the result of an attack. This is based on Maj. Gen. (select) Daniel Darnell's statement in Air Force magazine that space operators should "think possible attack" when something goes wrong with a space system. It is the military's job to worry about the worst-case scenario. Consider Pearl Harbor: The Japanese aircraft were detected, but no one thought to consider it as an attack because Japan didn't have the means to bring aircraft to Hawaii, or so they thought. The Air Force must consider whether a satellite malfunction or other problem is the result of an attack; that is a prime element in troubleshooting a problem with spacecraft. In the past, space operators tended to assume satellite anomalies were due to unintentional causes; failure to consider other possible sources could leave the true cause undiagnosed and hamper operations. In the Feb. 14 Defense News, a commentary by Theresa Hitchens argued that "even the most ardent space weapons proponents reveal that no one seriously believes major threats to on-orbit systems exist today." Does a "major threat" mean physical attacks on our systems? That risk may be low, but not that of electronic attack. We have seen on-orbit jamming of Tonga-Sat. We have had our broadcast uplinks intended for the Middle East jammed from Cuba; the British temporarily had one of their Skynet satellites hijacked, while more recently China had control of one of its communications satellites temporarily hijacked. Even if no one believes a major threat to on-orbit systems exists, the Air Force is looking ahead 10 to 20 years - that's how long it would take to design, develop and deploy an operational system. The idea that a trigger-happy military would accidentally push the United States into a war borders on absurdity. The Air Force rightly wants its satellite operators to consider all possibilities and is developing systems to differentiate between malfunctions and problems inflicted through physical and electronic attacks. The military emphasizes developing weapons that inflict reversible effects and reduce unintended consequences. There is a whole gamut of responses that can be taken militarily, economically and diplomatically. The Air Force is not going to decide to shoot first. The cognizant combatant command would take the lead in developing courses of action with nonmilitary options. Any employment of counterspace forces would be conducted under the aegis of the defense secretary and coordinated by the National Security Council; that is where the policy-makers weigh in.

#### American credibility is in terminal decline – can’t influence other nations

Clemons, Director @ New America Foundation, ’11

[Steve Clemons, Director of the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation where he previously served as Executive Vice President, and the former director of the Japan Policy Research Institute, Washington editor at large for The Atlantic and editor in chief of Atlantic, “America Next: End of the World As We Knew It,” August 12th 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/america-next-end-of-the-world-as-we-knew-it/243503/]

When the Berlin Wall fell in the summer of 1989, most of the world saw it as a crack so deep and fundamental in the superstructure of the Soviet Union that doubts about the USSR's solvency as a global power abounded. In nature, when a piece of ice larger than Rhode Island breaks off of Antarctica, one sees tangibly the very different world that global warming is shaping. In the case of the United States -- which has been indisputably the reigning global superpower for six decades -- there are signs -- ranging from the tumult in the Middle East to a humiliating war in Afghanistan to a downgrade of US sovereign debt -- that America is at a key inflection point in its history and that the US network of global control (aka, "empire") is disintegrating. Chalmers Johnson, a scholar who authored Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire before 9/11, argued in the 1990s that the US had become blind to the global push-back to American dictates. With the USSR gone and China the fastest growing market economy, the moniker of "leader of the free world" carried with it diminishing privileges and power. Without the Soviet menace threatening the global order, the cost-benefit relationship between other nations and the US fundamentally changed. Other countries were no longer willing to pay the same political price to the US for protection that they once did, a price paid in terms of following American leadership in global institutions, respecting and relying on the US dollar as the global reserve currency, following trade and economic policies that were largely crafted by America's financial elite, and accepting the reality of the Pentagon's global sprawl. The world today sees a diminished America -- one whose military power seems over-extended and hemorrhaging in Afghanistan; whose economic leadership was in doubt when the US exported toxic financial products to the world through the sub-prime crisis and which now is officially crippled given the first ratings downgrade of American bonds; whose moral leadership remains tied in knots as long as Guantanamo remains open and the self-confidence Americans once had in their own systems of justice and government continues to decline. It's through this lens that the hopeful-sounding Arab Spring, the riots in London, the tumultuous financial markets, and the rise of China and a new crop of ascending powers like Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa need to be considered. The old order is crumbling; a new one is forming -- but between them is chaos, uncertainty and social and political friction. When a frustrated, educated fruit peddler in Tunisia decided to end his life -- challenging his government for its corruption and ineptitude and setting himself on fire to demand dignity and respect, a spark was set in the minds of people throughout the Middle East who decided they were finished with governments that humiliated, harassed, and arbitrarily imprisoned, tortured, killed and abused their own citizens. The scenes of millions of people rising up in Egypt, in Tahrir Square in Cairo, and topping the 30-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak shocked everyone -- powerful and powerless alike. The equation of power changed. While the protesters and democracy activists deserve the great majority of credit for change -- part of the equation of Mubarak's downfall has to include the more humbled circumstances of the United States. America didn't forego its ally Mubarak and its interests in Egypt because of a moral decision to support what could have been fantasies of democracy and freedom of people in the streets, America had less ability than it had decades ago to control the temperature of affairs inside countries. Mubarak's reign had become too expensive for the US -- not financially, but politically -- in a world that increasingly doubted America's ability to achieve its objectives, to deliver on the values it often talked about. President Obama and his White House National Security Council team said that in the case of Egypt, there was a "great opportunity to align values and interests." The real answer is that "interests" were recalculated because the US commitments are overextended and the mystique of American power was now being challenged by thousands of pin-prick tests around the world. The decision by President Obama to join Great Britain and France in a humanitarian intervention in Libya exhibits the trap into which a diminished superpower with the memory of a globally dominant ego used to large ambitions can fall. Before the intervention, the US Department of Defense warned Obama that a "limited conflict" was dangerous -- that the resources for a larger conflict were not easily available and that a limited approach could lead to a long-term, costly stalemate with Moammer Qaddafi; and that even if the NATO intervention succeeded in destabilizing the Libyan dictator, the successor government could easily be ripped apart by internal tensions and either tribal or political/religious civil war. America's resource constraints -- as well as the limited military and financial capacities of US allies in Europe -- have produced a half-effort in Libya yielding exactly the stalemate thus far, that many national security experts feared. And with this stalemate, the US action -- which in the eyes of the world is a "defining action" -- creates a benchmark of US power and prestige that appears impotent. The Assad regime in Syria is engaged in full-scale, random assaults throughout the country on its own people -- detaining many thousands and wounding and killing many unarmed protesters and innocent, non-political bystanders. And yet the US and the West have virtually no influence on the internal dynamics at play in Syria. The Gulf Cooperation Council is issuing statements of concern -- but taking no serious action. The Arab League has said nothing. China and Russia -- while concerned about what is happening in Syria and encouraging "restraint" -- are not allowing the US to proceed with any UN Security Council measures. The world is paralyzed trying to respond to the horrific violence inside Syria, thus exposing the weakness of the United States in shaping Syria's incentives and disincentives in the world. The US has little with which to bribe, or seduce, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad -- and little with which to compel him. In the eyes of the Arab region, if Obama cannot prevail over the Israeli Prime Minister in hard fought political differences -- as over the continued expansion of Israeli settlements -- then to many of these leaders, Obama's power looks paper thin and ignorable. This is a tough spot for the United States to be in as it means that every challenge is harder, every burden heavier. Power, like an equity in the stock markets, is ultimately a function of future expectations -- and today the reality is that America's stock has fallen dramatically and will only rise again with visionary statecraft revolutionary, new global deal-making that might restore the impression that America once again matters.

#### There’s no correlation between hegemony and stability

Fettweis, ’10

[Christopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, 52:2, 59-82, March 25th 2010, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396331003764603>]

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible ‘peace dividend’ endangered both national and global security. ‘No serious analyst of American military capabilities’, argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, ‘doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace’.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

#### No Russia-China alliance – divergent economic interests and suspicion

Brooks and Wohlforth 5 (Stephen G., and William C., assistant professor and professor @ Dartmouth, International Security, Summer, Lexis)

A significant constraint on the development of deep Russia-China security ties is the nature of their economic relationship: trade between the two countries remains anemic; they do not have complementary economies from which high levels of trade can develop; and both are dependent to a large degree on inward flows of capital and technology, which come mainly from the West. Even more important, Russia's willingness to commit to its Asian partnerships is limited by its perceived weakness in the region. n22 Russians remain wary of China's growing economic and diplomatic clout, and express a general preference for diversifying Russia's Asian relationships. Suspicions plague both countries, stemming partly from mutual fears that each is using the other only to gain leverage over Washington. Many Russian analysts regard their country's partnership with India as a hedge against rising Chinese power in Asia. Russia tends to sell India more advanced weapons systems than it exports to China, and the agreements on the joint design and production of weapons that Russia has signed with India also tend to be deeper and more comprehensive than the arrangements that Moscow has made with Beijing. Russian officials are quick to cite these facts when questioned by domestic critics who accuse them of mortgaging Russia's security through the arms transfers to China.

### Econ

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Daniel Deudney, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton, April 1991, “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p. 27, google books,

Poverty Wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil. then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are warprone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modein era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.”’” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930 increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem. Power Wars. A third scenario is that environmental degradation might cause war by altering the relative power of states; that is, newly stronger states may be tempted to prey upon the newly weaker ones, or weakened states may attack and lock in their positions before their power ebbs firther. But such alterations might not lead to war as readily as the lessons of history suggest, because economic power and military power are not as tightly coupled as in the past. The economic power positions of Germany and Japan have changed greatly since World War 11, but these changes have not been accompanied by war or threat of war. In the contemporary world, whole industries rise, fall, and relocate, causing substantial fluctuations in the economic well-being of regions and peoples without producing wars. There is no reason to believe that changes in relative wealth and power caused by the uneven impact of environmental degradation would inevitably lead to war. Even if environmental degradation were to destroy the basic social and economic fabric of a country or region, the impact on international order may not be very great. Among the first casualties in such country would be the capacity to wage war. The poor and wretched of the earth may be able to deny an outside aggressor an easy conquest, but they are themselves a minimal threat to other states. Contemporary offensive military operations require complex organizational skills, specialized industrial products and surplus wealth.

#### Human demands are overstretching earth’s capacity – collapse of the biosphere is inevitable

Boston 2011 - Professor of Public Policy at Victoria University of Wellington and was Director of the Institute of Policy Studies (November, Jonathan, “Biophysical Limits and Green Growth,” Policy Quarterly – Volume 7, Issue 4 <http://ips.ac.nz/publications/files/45dbb0b603c.pdf>)

To illustrate briefly: a large-scale project – the ‘Millennium Ecosystem Assessment’ – sponsored by the United Nations and involving 1,300 leading scientists over several years was completed in 2005. The authors of the synthesis report on Ecosystems and Human Well-Being observed that of the various ecosystem services2 examined, approximately 60% were ‘degraded’ or being ‘used unsustainably’, including fresh water, capture fisheries, and air and water purification (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Similarly, the report highlighted evidence of an increasing ‘likelihood of nonlinear changes in ecosystems (including accelerating, abrupt and potentially irreversible changes) that have important consequences for human well-being’. These include ‘abrupt alterations in water quality, the creation of “dead zones” in coastal waters, the collapse of fisheries, and shifts in regional climates’. To compound problems, genetic diversity is declining, as is the number of species on the planet. It is estimated that since around 1800 ‘humans have increased the species extinction rate by as much as 1,000 times over background rates typical over the planet’s history’. Currently, up to 30% of mammal, bird and amphibian species are threatened with extinction. And to make matters worse, the growing human population, projected to reach at least 9 billion by 2050, is bound to increase pressures on already fragile ecosystems. As a result, the earth faces another great spasm of extinction – but this time caused by humanity, not natural forces (see also Sukhdev et al., 2008).

Related to this, a team of scientists concluded in 2002 that humanity’s collective demands began to exceed the earth’s regenerative capacity about 1980 (Brown, 2009, p.14). By 2009, the demands on natural systems exceeded their sustainable yield capacity by close to 30%. This means that human beings are depleting the planet’s natural assets and doing so at an increasing rate. Such trends can continue only for so long before negative feedback mechanisms are triggered, critical thresholds are crossed, and irreversible ecosystem damage is inflicted. Hence, while the relevant timescales are uncertain, the long-term implications are clear.

#### Maintaining growth causes total ecosystem collapse—multiple scenarios for extinction

Barry, PhD ecologist, 12—President and Founder of Ecological Internet, PhD in Land Resources from the U of Wisconsin-Madison, MSc in Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development from U of Wisconsin-Madison, BA in political science from Marquette U (Glen, 1/31/2012, “EARTH MEANDERS: On Violence and Earth Revolution”, EcoEarth, <http://www.ecoearth.info/blog/2012/01/on_violence_and_earth_revoluti.asp#more>)

Earth's ecosystems are collapsing under the burden of human growth, destroying our one shared biosphere that makes life possible. Industrial growth ? frantically destroying ecosystems to feed insatiable, ever-growing appetites ? is an aberration, a mistake, a disease. If left untreated, this will be the end of the human family, all life, and Earth's very being. Infinite economic growth at the expense of ecosystems is impossible, and seeking endless and inequitable growth in consumption and population can only lead to collapse and massive die-off.

Humanity’s last best chance to justly and equitably sustain a livable planet is to protect and restore ecosystems, end fossil fuels, and a people's power Earth revolution to utterly destroy the ecocidal industrial growth machine. We are all bloody fools to tolerate and not immediately overthrow a violently ecocidal system that is killing us all. If we all understood the implications of global ecosystem collapse, we would go now, together, and slay the global growth machine. It is **too late** to escape **profound ecological decline**, yet complete disastrous social and ecological collapse ? and possible end to most or all life ? may yet be avoided.

Sustaining ecology must become society?s central organizing principle or humans and all species face horrendous death. Globally it is time for radical change to simply survive converging ecology, food, war, water, inequity, population, climate, jobs, ocean, and extinction crises. It is deeply troubling most "environmentalists" deny the severity of ecosystem collapse, rejecting out of hand revolutionary measures sufficient to sustain ecology.

Nuclear war doesn’t cause extinction

Martin 82, associate prof in [Science, Technology and Society](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/ssmac/sts/index.html) at the U of Wollongong, (Brian, Critique of nuclear extinction, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1982, pp. 287-300 http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82jpr.html)

Such an eventuality would be a catastrophe of enormous proportions, but it is far from extinction. Even in the most extreme case there would remain alive some 4000 million people, about nine-tenths of the world's population, most of them unaffected physically by the nuclear war. The following areas would be relatively unscathed, unless nuclear attacks were made in these regions: South and Central America, Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, Australasia, Oceania and large parts of China. Even in the mid-latitudes of the northern hemisphere where most of the nuclear weapons would be exploded, areas upwind of nuclear attacks would remain free of heavy radioactive contamination, such as Portugal, Ireland and British Columbia. Many people, perhaps especially in the peace movement, believe that global nuclear war will lead to the death of most or all of the world's population. Yet the available scientific evidence provides no basis for this belief. Furthermore, there seem to be no convincing scientific arguments that nuclear war could cause human extinction.[[13]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82jpr.html#fn13#fn13) In particular, the idea of 'overkill', if taken to imply the capacity to kill everyone on earth, is highly misleading.[[14]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82jpr.html#fn14#fn14)In the absence of any positive evidence, statements that nuclear war will lead to the death of all or most people on earth should be considered exaggerations. In most cases the exaggeration is unintended, since people holding or stating a belief in nuclear extinction are quite sincere.[[15]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82jpr.html#fn15#fn15)

### 2NC

#### Hard power fails – the costs of war, growth of democracy, and international institutions all make it an outdated system.

Gallarotti 13, Professor of Government @ Wesleyan University

(Giulio M. Gallarotti, John Andrus Center for Public Affairs, Professor of Government, Environmental Studies, and Social Studies, ex-Visiting Professor of Economic Theory @ University of Rome, “Smart Power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use”, Division II Faculty Publications Paper 129, presented at “Smart Power: Transforming Militaries for 21st Century Missions” @ SAFTI Military Institute, Feb. 2013, http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/div2facpubs/129/)

First, the costs of using or even threatening force among nuclear powers have ¶ skyrocketed. Indeed, current leading scholarship in the field of security has proclaimed that the ¶ nuclear revolution has been instrumental in creating a new age of a “security community,” in ¶ which war between major powers is almost unthinkable because the costs of war have become ¶ too great (Jervis 1988, 1993, 2002). Mueller (1988) reinforces and modifies the nuclear¶ deterrent argument by introducing the independent deterrent of conventional war in an age of ¶ advanced technology. In short, the utility of respect, admiration and cooperation (i.e., soft power) ¶ has increased relative to the utility of coercion with respect to the usefulness of the instruments ¶ of statecraft. Moreover, the exorbitant dangers that the hard resources of military technology ¶ have produced require far greater use of the instruments of soft power in order for nations to ¶ achieve sustainable security in the long run. ¶ Second, the growth of democracy in the world system has served to compound the ¶ disutility of coercion and force as the actors bearing the greatest burden of such coercion and ¶ force (the people) have political power over decisionmakers. In this respect, the process of ¶ democratic peace has altered power relations among nations (Doyle 1997, Russett and Oneal ¶ 2001, and Ray 1995). As individuals become politically empowered, they can generate strong ¶ impediments to the use of force and coercion. But even beyond the enfranchisement effect, ¶ democratic cultural naturally drives national leaders towards the liberal principles manifest in the ¶ cannons of soft power. Hence, national leaders are much more constrained to work within softer ¶ foreign policy boundaries, boundaries that limit the use of force, threat and bribery. Rather, ¶ outcomes are engineered through policies more consistent with liberal democratic legitimacy. ¶ Third, the diminishing utility of hard power is partly the result of a specific political, ¶ social and economic context created by modernization: that context is interdependence (Herz ¶ 1957, Osgood and Tucker 1967, Keohane and Nye 1989, and Nye 2004a). Using sticks, or ¶ whatever kinds of coercive methods, generate considerable costs in an interdependent world. ¶ Indeed in such an interpenetrated world, punishing or threatening other nations is tantamount to self-punishment. In such an environment strategies for optimizing national wealth and influence ¶ have shifted from force and coercion to cooperation. But even more elusive than the quest to ¶ limit the fallout from coercion and force in such an environment, is the quest to impose some¶ specific outcomes onto targeted actors. In an interpenetrated world, targeted actors have many ¶ more avenues of escape. Transnational actors and national leaders could avoid being compelled ¶ by carrots or sticks because of their free reign and access to the international political economy. ¶ They can merely escape coercion or buy-offs by taking refuge in numerous possible international ¶ havens. In one important respect, this modern day “economic feudalism” created by¶ interdependence is shifting the nexus of power from the territorial state to transnational networks ¶ (Nye 2002, p. 75). Globalization has strongly compounded the effects of interdependence by enhancing the ¶ process of social and economic interpenetration in the international system. The global age has ¶ given civil societies the capacity to receive and transmit information, as well as move across ¶ nations with ever greater speed and magnitude. These greater links compound the ¶ interdependence among networks containing both transnational actors and national¶ governments. As the international stakes of these transnational actors grow, so do their ¶ incentives to expend political capital within their own domestic political systems to reinforce the ¶ economic ties between their nations (Milner 1988). This enhanced access to foreign ¶ governments and citizens created by globalization also compounds the effects of democratization ¶ in creating political impediments to the use of hard power (Haskel 1980). These forces have ¶ both diminished possibilities of political conflict and have thus shifted the epicenter of¶ competition away from force, threat, and bribery (Rosecrance 1999 and Nye 2004b. p. 31). Fourth, social and political changes have made modern populations more sensitive to ¶ their economic fates, and consequently far less enamored of a “warrior ethic” (Jervis 2002 and ¶ Nye 2004b, p. 19). This “prosperous society” has compounded the influence of economics and ¶ made economic interdependence that much more compelling as a constraint to the utility of hard ¶ power. With the rise of this welfare/economic orientation and the spread of democracy, national ¶ leaders have been driven more by the economic imperative and less by foreign adventurism as a ¶ source of political survival (Gallarotti 2000 and Ruggie 1983). This prosperous society, through ¶ the political vehicle of democracy, has shifted not only domestic but also foreign policy ¶ orientations. The economic welfare concern has put a premium on cooperation that can deliver ¶ economic growth and employment, and worked against hard power policies that might undercut ¶ such goals. ¶ Finally, the growth of international organization and regimes in the post-war period has ¶ embedded nations more firmly in networks of cooperation: in effect nations are increasingly ¶ functioning in a world of law and norms. In such a world, unilateral actions that disregard these ¶ institutions become far more costly. Such institutions have effectively raised the minimum level ¶ of civil behavior in international politics, and consequently raised the importance of soft power ¶ significantly. Consequently, the networks of cooperation have made nations far less likely to ¶ extract compliance in what are considered illegitimate ways, i.e., through force, coercion, or ¶ bribery (Krasner 1983 and Keohane and Nye 1989)¶

### 2NC Overview

#### Environmental collapse outweighs –

#### First, it’s global – they only access limited wars, warming and resource overconsumption lead to global extinction

#### Second, reversibility – we can rebuild after war but there’s no way to bring back extinct species – means our impact is uniquely likely to spill over

#### Third, environmental impacts happen now but war from economic decline is empirically denied

#### History proves decline won’t cause war

Ferguson 2006 (Niall, MA, D.Phil., is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University. He is a resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. He is also a Senior Reseach Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modernhistoriography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all thecountries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start warsof aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole.Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars

#### Dedev ends all war and violence

Ted Trainer, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the School of Social Work, University of New South Wales, 1995, The Conserver Society, p. 165

If the foregoing analysis is valid, not much needs to be said about the alternative. We must develop ways of life in which all can live well without taking more than their fair share and therefore without living in fear of someone else threatening what we have. That is precisely what a radical conserver society involves. A world made up of relatively small communities which were supplying their own needs mostly from their local resources, and concerned primarily with enjoying a life rich in cultural and craft and community activities, without any interest in constantly increasing the amount they consume, would be a far more secure world. There would be no point in you attacking anyone, because you would not want much and what you did want you would have in abundance from local sources. Similarly you would not feel any need for weapons with which to defend yourself, because you would know that others were living comfortable and interesting lives without wanting more resources than they could supply for themselves and therefore they would have no interest in attacking you. Security is an impossible goal if it is conceived in terms of developing the arms needed to defend our imperial interests and to defend ourselves against attack — while we insist on lifestyles which inevitably involve us in taking more than our fair share and therefore asserting control over ‘ours oilfields in the Middle East and in turn having to be armed to the teeth to fight off threats to them. Real security consists in knowing no one has any desire to threaten you.

### 2NC Sustainability

#### If we win sustainability it’s not possible for them to get offense – Frame the debate through when to collapse the economy – sooner is better, we need to end growth while the biosphere can recover

#### Collapse is coming now – that’s Boston – our demands on the biosphere overstretch earth’s capacity – overfishing, lack of fresh water, pollution, and population growth means the environment can’t sustain life indefinitely

#### Collapse now is key

Glen Barry, Ph.D. in "Land Resources" from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Masters of Science in "Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development", 1/14/08, “Economic Collapse And Global Ecology”, Counter Currents, http://www.countercurrents.org/barry140108.htm,

Humanity and the Earth are faced with an enormous conundrum -- sufficient climate policies enjoy political support only in times of rapid economic growth. Yet this growth is the primary factor driving greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental ills. The growth machine has pushed the planet well beyond its ecological carrying capacity, and unless constrained, can only lead to human extinction and an end to complex life. With every economic downturn, like the one now looming in the United States, it becomes more difficult and less likely that policy sufficient to ensure global ecological sustainability will be embraced. This essay explores the possibility that from a biocentric viewpoint of needs for long-term global ecological, economic and social sustainability; it would be better for the economic collapse to come now rather than later. Economic growth is a deadly disease upon the Earth, with capitalism as its most virulent strain. Throw-away consumption and explosive population growth are made possible by using up fossil fuels and destroying ecosystems. Holiday shopping numbers are covered by media in the same breath as Arctic ice melt, ignoring their deep connection. Exponential economic growth destroys ecosystems and pushes the biosphere closer to failure. Humanity has proven itself unwilling and unable to address climate change and other environmental threats with necessary haste and ambition. Action on coal, forests, population, renewable energy and emission reductions could be taken now at net benefit to the economy. Yet, the losers -- primarily fossil fuel industries and their bought oligarchy -- successfully resist futures not dependent upon their deadly products. Perpetual economic growth, and necessary climate and other ecological policies, are fundamentally incompatible. Global ecological sustainability depends critically upon establishing a steady state economy, whereby production is right-sized to not diminish natural capital. Whole industries like coal and natural forest logging will be eliminated even as new opportunities emerge in solar energy and environmental restoration. This critical transition to both economic and ecological sustainability is simply not happening on any scale. The challenge is how to carry out necessary environmental policies even as economic growth ends and consumption plunges. The natural response is going to be liquidation of even more life-giving ecosystems, and jettisoning of climate policies, to vainly try to maintain high growth and personal consumption. We know that humanity must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% over coming decades. How will this and other necessary climate mitigation strategies be maintained during years of economic downturns, resource wars, reasonable demands for equitable consumption, and frankly, the weather being more pleasant in some places? If efforts to reduce emissions and move to a steady state economy fail; the collapse of ecological, economic and social systems is assured. Bright greens take the continued existence of a habitable Earth with viable, sustainable populations of all species including humans as the ultimate truth and the meaning of life. Whether this is possible in a time of economic collapse is crucially dependent upon whether enough ecosystems and resources remain post collapse to allow humanity to recover and reconstitute sustainable, relocalized societies. It may be better for the Earth and humanity's future that economic collapse comes sooner rather than later, while more ecosystems and opportunities to return to nature's fold exist. Economic collapse will be deeply wrenching -- part Great Depression, part African famine. There will be starvation and civil strife, and a long period of suffering and turmoil. Many will be killed as balance returns to the Earth. Most people have forgotten how to grow food and that their identity is more than what they own. Yet there is some justice, in that those who have lived most lightly upon the land will have an easier time of it, even as those super-consumers living in massive cities finally learn where their food comes from and that ecology is the meaning of life. Economic collapse now means humanity and the Earth ultimately survive to prosper again. Human suffering -- already the norm for many, but hitting the currently materially affluent -- is inevitable given the degree to which the planet's carrying capacity has been exceeded. We are a couple decades at most away from societal strife of a much greater magnitude as the Earth's biosphere fails. Humanity can take the bitter medicine now, and recover while emerging better for it; or our total collapse can be a final, fatal death swoon. A successful revolutionary response to imminent global ecosystem collapse would focus upon bringing down the Earth's industrial economy now. As society continues to fail miserably to implement necessary changes to allow creation to continue, maybe the best strategy to achieve global ecological sustainability is economic sabotage to hasten the day. It is more fragile than it looks.

#### Several reasons collapse is inevitable:

#### First, declining agricultural production

Peter Goodchild, “”The Imminent Collapse of Industrial Society,” COUNTERCURRENTS, 5-9-10, www.countercurrents.org/goodchild090510.htm, accessed 9-22-10.

In the entire world there are 15,749,300 km 2 of arable land. [CIA] This is 11 percent of the world's total land area. The present world population (in 2010) is about 6.9 billion. Dividing the figure for population by that for arable land, we see that there are about 440 people per km 2 of arable land. On a smaller scale that means about 4 people per hectare. Only about a third of the world's 200-odd countries are actually within that realistic ratio of 4:1. In other words, we have already reached the limits of the number of people who can be supported by non-mechanized agriculture.

The UK, for example, has a population-to-arable ratio of slightly more than 10 people per hectare. What exactly is going to happen to the 6 people who will not fit onto the hectare? But many countries have far worse ratios.

#### Second, models prove

Heyes 2012 (April 27, J.D., “MIT computer simulation predicts total global economic collapse in less than 20 years” <http://www.naturalnews.com/035700_MIT_economic_collapse_simulation.html>)

Don't look now, but some of the world's smartest people are even predicting the end of the global economic order as we know it, and they're saying it'll happen within the next two decades. According to a group of researchers from the Jay W. Forrester's institute at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), a computer simulation concluded that the world could suffer a "global economic collapse" coupled by a "precipitous population decline" at current rates of resource consumption. The research was conducted on behalf of a group known as the The Club of Rome, which bills itself "as an informal association of independent leading personalities from politics, business and science, men and women who are long-term thinkers interested in contributing in a systemic interdisciplinary and holistic manner to a better world." Founded in 1968, The Club of Rome aims "to identify the most crucial problems which will determine the future of humanity through integrated and forward-looking analysis; to evaluate alternative scenarios for the future and to assess risks, choices and opportunities," and to help find solutions to "challenges." According to the group's web site, the research project "took into account the relations between various global developments and produced computer simulations for alternative scenarios." "Part of the modeling were different amounts of possibly available resources, different levels of agricultural productivity, birth control or environmental protection," it said. World still on course for self-destruction The recent MIT research builds upon an earlier body of work from the same esteemed institution, dated 1972, that some in the scientific community regard infamous. According to a report in the Smithsonian Magazine, a team led by researcher Dennis Meadows used computer modeling for the first time in an attempt to answer "a centuries-old question: When will the population outgrow the planet and the natural resources it has to offer?" That work was later made into a book titled The Limits to Growth and has since sold over 10 million copies in 37 languages. Essentially it "warned that if current trends in population, industrialization, pollution, food production and resource depletion continued, that dark time -- marked by a plummeting population, a contracting economy and environmental collapse -- would come within 100 years," the Smithsonian Magazine reported. That work was later supported by data presented in the form of a graph designed by Australian physicist Graham Turner, which purports to show how actual data from the 30-year period between 1970 and 2000 matches almost exactly predictions set forth in Meadows' work. Meadows, who retired in 2004 after 35 years as a professor at MIT, Dartmouth College and the University of New Hampshire, discussed his original research with the Smithsonian on the 40th anniversary of the publishing of The Limits to Growth. He said his team's "goal was to gather empirical data to test" a theoretical situation showing "the interrelationship of some key global growth factors: population, resources, persistent pollution, food production and industrial activity." In describing what he meant by a "collapse," Meadows said the model assumed a "business-as-usual" approach to pressing issues of overuse and over-consumption. "In the world model, if you don't make big changes soon -- back in the '70s or '80s -- then in the period from 2020 to 2050, population, industry, food and the other variables reach their peaks and then start to fall," he said. "That's what we call collapse." Most of the computer models found steady population and economic growth rates until about 2030. Then, the researchers found, conditions begin to decline, and without "drastic measures for environmental protection," scenarios began predicting higher likelihoods of population and economic crashes.

#### Third, pollution from tech advances

Jouvet and de Perthuis 2012 - Paris Ouest Nanterre University and Scientific Director of the Climate Economics Chair AND Professor at Paris-Dauphine University and President of the Climate Economics Chair’s Scientific Committee (June, Pierre-Andre and Christian, “Green Growth: From Intention to Implementation ,” Les Cahiers de la Chaire Economie du Climat n° 15 Information and debates Series, <http://www.chaireeconomieduclimat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/12-06-19-GG-engFINAL.pdf>)

In a retroactive way, deterioration of these services may negatively impact our production capacities directly or indirectly. For example, air pollution can degrade human capital, generating a significant cost for the whole economy. Similarly, the loss of biodiverisity, increased scarcity of forest resources and deterioration of groundwater each constitutes a degradation of productive capital. Clearly, natural capital plays a significant role in the productivity of the two factors of production traditionally taken into account. It follows that some portion of the creation of value is attributable to natural capital.

Exogenous and endogenous growth models assign a key role to the global parameter, A, of the production function and attempt to shape it. If we accept that the reproduction conditions of human capital and physical capital partly depend on the state of the environment, then the multiplicative factor of the production function must depend on the overall quality of our environment (Q), i.e. A = A(Q). Thus, the production function incorporating the environment depends not only on pollution emitted during the production process but also on the accumulation of this pollution, P, which alters the conditions under which production occurs. Viewing the quality of the environment as a decreasing function of the total amount of pollution, P, it is evident that the pollution flow constantly being emitted will increase the total stock by degrading the conditions of production itself. The model developed in the annex shows that above a certain level, this retroaction leads to zero production, i.e. to the disappearance of the economy. The quality of the environment becomes a constitutive component of growth. We need therefore to devise a model that can successfully make a connection between pollution both as a factor of production and a cause of limitation of that growth.

These production factor aspects should make us think not only about the distribution of wealth among the factors of production, but also about the conditions for production growth. Investing in environmental quality implies not only a reduced role of pollution in production but also an improvement in overall production conditions and therefore in growth conditions.

#### Fourth, carbon sinks

Boston 2011 - Professor of Public Policy at Victoria University of Wellington and was Director of the Institute of Policy Studies (November, Jonathan, “Biophysical Limits and Green Growth,” Policy Quarterly – Volume 7, Issue 4 <http://ips.ac.nz/publications/files/45dbb0b603c.pdf>)

Waste absorption limits While the planet’s natural resources are limited, so too are its ‘sinks’. In other words, the capacity of the biosphere to absorb or assimilate the waste and pollution generated by economic activity is constrained. Hence, even if the scarcity of certain resource inputs does not constrain economic growth and human activity over the foreseeable future, waste absorption limits may well have adverse consequences (see Reynolds, 2011). The limited capacity of the biosphere to absorb humanity’s increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, especially carbon dioxide (CO2), is perhaps the greatest single threat on the horizon. Currently, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 are rising rapidly (at around 2.5 parts per million per annum); within a few years they will reach 400 parts per million (or more than 40% above preindustrial levels). Global mean surface temperatures, which have already risen by about 0.8°C over the past century, are projected to increase by at least another 2°C by 2100, unless GHG emissions are substantially reduced. Such warming and related climate changes will have serious and potentially irreversible consequences, including substantial sea-level rise, more severe storms and droughts, and a massive loss of biodiversity. By the end of the century, the sea level could be as much as a metre higher (and possibly more). Such a rise will cause huge and widespread damage to coastal infrastructure and settlements (including roads, railway ... any serious and protracted global food shortages could have major economic, social and political consequences – including the risk of civil disorder and violent conflict. lines and ports), and inundate many river deltas and low-lying islands. It is hard to believe that such damage could occur without having negative impacts on global economic growth, as well as human well-being. Despite these risks, few governments have implemented significant or effective policy measures to reduce GHG emissions.

#### Fifth, consumerism

Alexander 2012 - lecturer in 'Consumerism and Sustainahility' at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne. He is also Co-Director of the Simplicity Institute (January 15, Samuel, “Peak Oil, Energy Descent, and the Fate of Consumerism” [http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985677](http://ssrn.com/abstract%3D1985677))

Within the most developed regions of the world, these recent decades of unprecedented economic growth have all but solved the economic problem of how to secure the necessities of life and, indeed, have resulted in most people living lives of relative luxury and comfort. Although a small residue of abject poverty remains in these regions, on the whole ordinary people are materially wealthy when considered in the context of all known history or when compared with the multitudes around the world who still struggle for a bare subsistence. As economist, Clive Hamilton, puts it, 'Most Westerners today are prosperous beyond the dreams of their grandparents'9 - a point that should be moderated in light of the global financial crisis but which remains valid as a general statement. The houses of typical families are bigger than ever, sprawling across expanding suburbs, and these houses are each filled with untold numbers of consumer products, such as multiple TVs, stereos, computers, mobile phones, racks of unused clothes, washing machines, fridges, dishwashers, dryers, vacuum cleaners, kitchen gadgets, etc. These products often overflow into garages or hired storage rooms to create spaces full of accumulated 'stuff.' Houses are often centrally heated and air-conditioned, with spare rooms, and two or more cars parked outside. Average wages are well above subsistence levels, meaning that almost everyone has spare income to spend on comforts and luxuries such as meat, alcohol, take-away food, going to the movies, non-essential clothes or furniture, books, taking holidays, etc. People generally have access to a variety of public services, including free primary and secondary education. On top of all this, democratic political systems (however imperfect) seem firmly established, the water is clean, and almost nobody goes hungry.

These consumer lifestyles are indicative of unprecedented material wealth, which it will not be suggested is a bad thing, necessarily. But it is a form of socio-economic development that has been, and continues to be, extremely energy intensive. It takes homes and high-rise buildings; to grow and transport our food; to build and fuel the one billion vehicles that move people and things around the world; to light our homes and power our appliances; to produce countless commodities that provide us with our technologically sophisticated goods, services, and entertainment, etc. In short, it takes vast amounts of energy to support high-consumption lifestyles, and it is worth spending some time getting a clearer grasp on exactly how energy intensive - how oil intensive, in particular - these consumer lifestyles are.

#### Sixth, complexity

Vail 5 – Jeff Vail, attorney at Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP in Denver, Colorado specializing in litigation and energy issues, former intelligence officer with the US Air Force and energy infrastructure counterterrorism specialist with the US Department of the Interior, April 28, 2005, “The Logic of Collapse,” online: <http://www.jeffvail.net/2005/04/logic-of-collapse.html>

But despite the declining marginal returns, society is not capable of reducing expenditure, or even reducing the growth in expenditure. I discuss this at length in A Theory of Power, but the basic fact is that society is—at its very root—an evolutionary development that uses a continual increase in complexity to address social needs—and to ensure its own survival. So, as societies continue to invest more and more in social complexity at lower and lower marginal rates of return, they become more and more inefficient until eventually they are no longer capable of withstanding even commonplace stresses. They collapse.¶ This may seem too deterministic—after all, it suggests that all societies will eventually collapse. While that may cause our inherent sense of hubris to perk up for a moment, we should remember that this equation fits our data quite well—every civilization that has ever existed has, in fact, collapsed. Our present global civilization is, or course, the sole exception. A look back at the contemporary chroniclers of history shows that every “great” civilization thinks that they are somehow different, that history will not repeat with them—and their hubris is shared with gusto by members of the present global civilization.¶ Of course, as discrete empires and societies grow ever more cumbersome they do not always collapse in the spectacular fashion of the Western Roman Empire. If they exist in a “peer-polity” situation—that is, they are surrounded by competitors of similar levels of complexity—then they will tend to be conquered and absorbed. It is only in the case of a power vacuum—like the Chacoans or Western Romans—that we witness such a spectacular loss of complexity. In the “modern” world, we have not witnessed such a collapse as we exist in a global peer-polity continuum. When the Spanish empire grew too cumbersome the British were there to take over, and the mantel has since passed on to America, with the EU, China and others waiting eagerly in the wings. In the modern world there can no longer be an isolated collapse—our next experience with this will be global.¶ In fact, the modern civilization continuum has existed for so long without a global collapse because we have managed to tap new energy sources—coal, then oil—each with a higher energy surplus than the last. This has buoyed the marginal return curve temporarily with each discovery, but has not changed the fundamental dynamics of collapse.¶ Perhaps we should take a step back and look at collapse in general. Our psychological investment in the “goodness” of “high-civilization” leads to the commonly held conclusion that collapse is bad—and that to advocate it would be irrational. But from a purely economic point of view, collapse actually increases the overall benefit that social complexity provides to society for their level of investment. It makes economic sense. In the graph above, C3-B1 and C1-B1 provide the same benefit to society—but for dramatically different support burdens required to maintain their respective levels of complexity. C1-B1 is a much more desirable location for a society than C3-B1, so collapse from C3-B1 to C1-B1 is actually a good thing. With the growing burden of today’s global society, the global inequality and injustice that seems to grow daily, collapse is beginning to make economic sense. In fact, an entire philosophical movement, Primitivism, has sprung up dedicated to convincing the world that a “C1-B1”, hamlet society is in fact a far better place.¶ Despite the growing logic of collapse, in today’s peer-polity world that option does not exist except on a global scale. Today we have 3 options:¶ 1. Continue business as usual, accepting declining marginal returns on investments in complexity (and very soon declining overall returns) until an eventual, inevitable collapse occurs globally. Continuation of present patterns will continue the escalating environmental damage, and will continue to grow the human population, with population levels in increasing excess of the support capacity of a post-collapse Earth (i.e. more people will die in the collapse).¶ 2. Locate a new, more efficient energy source to subsidize marginal returns on our investments in complexity. This does not mean discover more oil or invent better clean coal technology—these, along with solar or wind power still provide lower marginal returns than oil in the heyday of cheap Saudi oil. Only the development of super-efficient fusion power seems to provide the ability to delay the decline of marginal returns any appreciable amount, and this will still serve to only delay and exacerbate the eventual return to option #1.¶ 3. Precipitate a global collapse now in order to reap the economic benefits of this action while minimizing the costs of the collapse that will continue to increase with the complexity and population of our global civilization. When combined with a strategy to replace hierarchy with rhizome, as outlined in A Theory of Power, Chapter 9, this may even represent a long-term sustainable strategy.¶ Whoa. Am I seriously suggesting the triggering of a global collapse? For the moment I’m just suggesting that we explore the idea. If, after deliberation, we accept the totality of the three options as outlined above, then triggering collapse stands as the only responsible choice. It is—admittedly—a choice that is so far outside the realm of consideration of most people (who are strongly invested in the Myth of the West) that they will never take it seriously. But critically, it does not necessarily require their consent…¶ These may seem like the ramblings of a madman. But in the late Western Roman Empire, there is a fact that is simply not taught today because it is too far outside our tolerance for things that run counter to the Myth of the West: The citizens of Rome wanted to end the Empire, to dissolve its cumbersome structure, but could not reverse its pre-programmed course. Many—perhaps most—welcomed the invading barbarians with open arms.¶ So should collapse be triggered now, or should we wait as long as possible? If we accept the inevitability of collapse, then it should be triggered as soon as possible, as the cost of implementing a collapse strategy is continually growing…¶ Throughout history, when collapse has occurred, it has been a blessing. The mainstream continues to cling to the beliefs that collapse will be a terrible loss, and that it is not inevitable. Even with all of our cultural brain-washing, do we really have so much hubris as to hold on to the tired mantra that “this time, in our civilization, things will be different”?

#### A2: Tech solves

#### First, a framing argument: their authors are biased – we have a psychological propensity to think the status quo can solve even when it can’t – prefer our statistical evidence

Robert Jensen, professor in the School of Journalism at the University of Texas, 9/1/10, “A World In Collapse?”, http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article\_comments/a\_world\_in\_collapse/,

I think not only leftists, but people in general, avoid these realities because reality is so grim. It seems overwhelming to most people, for good reason. So, rather than confront it, people find modes of evasion. One is to deny there’s a reason to worry, which is common throughout the culture. The most common evasive strategy I hear from people on the left is “technological fundamentalism”—the idea that because we want high-energy/high-tech solutions that will allow us to live in the style to which so many of us have become accustomed, those solutions will be found. That kind of magical thinking is appealing but unrealistic, for two reasons. First, while the human discoveries of the past few centuries are impressive, they have not been on the scale required to correct the course we’re on; we’ve created problems that have grown beyond our capacity to understand and manage. Second, those discoveries were subsidized by fossil-fuel energy that won’t be around much longer, which dramatically limits what we will be able to accomplish through energy-intensive advanced technology. As many people have pointed out, technology is not energy; you don’t replace energy with technology. Technology can make some processes more energy-efficient, but it can’t create energy out of thin air.

#### Tech is insufficient to solve the environment – several things it can’t address

#### First is fisheries – not enough food in the ocean to feed everyone – that causes mass death from disease, starvation, and resource wars

#### Second, soil erosion – undermines even subsistence agriculture which spills over to global food production causing extinction - That’s Boston

#### Third, requires too much energy and increases consumption

Hall and Klitgaard 2012 - associate professor at the State University of New York AND professor of economics and the Patti McGill Peterson Professor of Social Sciences at Wells College (C.A.S. and K., “Are There Limits to Growth? Examining the Evidence” Energy and the Wealth of Nations: Understanding the Biophysical Economy, Springer Link)

Technology does not work for free, however, and it can be a double-edged sword whose benefits can be substantially blunted by Jevons’s paradox – the concept that increases in effi ciency often lead to lower prices (Jevons found in the middle of the nineteenth century that more effi - cient steam engines were cheaper to run so that people used them more, as today more fuel- effi cient automobiles tend to be driven more miles in a year) and hence to greater consumption of resources [ 18 ] . Probably the more important problem with technology is its energy cost. As originally pointed out in the early 1970s by Odum and Pimentel, increased agricultural yield is achieved principally through the greater use of fossil fuel for cultivation, fertilizers, pesticides, drying, and so on, so that it takes some 10 cal of petroleum to generate each calorie of food that we eat. The fuel used is divided nearly equally among the farm, transport and processing, and preparation. The net effect is that roughly 19% of all of the energy used in the United States goes to our food system. Malthus could not have foreseen this enormous increase in food production through petroleum. In fact Malthus, who was associated with and supported by the landed gentry, tended to view machines not as a means of pushing back the collision between human food needs and agricultural production but rather as threatening the position of the landed class.

#### Fourth, negative externalities mean even if tech solves in the short term it ultimately damages the environment

Jouvet and de Perthuis 2012 - Paris Ouest Nanterre University and Scientific Director of the Climate Economics Chair AND Professor at Paris-Dauphine University and President of the Climate Economics Chair’s Scientific Committee (June, Pierre-Andre and Christian, “Green Growth: From Intention to Implementation ,” Les Cahiers de la Chaire Economie du Climat n° 15 Information and debates Series, <http://www.chaireeconomieduclimat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/12-06-19-GG-engFINAL.pdf>)

In approaches involving technical progress, it is possible to obtain infinite growth even in an economy whose development is based on a finite resource. Indeed, if we accept that technological progress can continually compensate for the depletion of the resource, then infinite growth is possible. Intuitively, if we use 10 litres of gasoline to drive 100 km, and our gasoline reserve is 100 litres, then without technical progress we can expect to travel a maximum of 1000 km. By introducing technical progress that allows us to drive 500 km on 10 litres of gasoline, then we can go 5000 km. So if we constantly improve our consumption performance then it is not impossible to travel an unlimited distance with the last drop of gasoline: the progress of human intelligence will have find perfect substitutes to ensure our mobility without gasoline. Thus without too much difficulty we can imagine infinite growth in a finite world.

The historical analysis carried out in Part I recalled that beyond limits to growth based on resource depletion, we must turn to externalities. Although technical progress and substitution between factors of production suggest that we can circumvent the depletion of natural resources, there are nonetheless still limits how much the planet can withstand. There is probably more to fear by way of damage to the conditions for reproducing resources, disruption of regulatory systems and loss of biodiversity than the potential depletion of resources. How can we incorporate pollution into our reasoning?

#### Globalization guarantees disease spread -- makes transmission quicker and likelier.

**Gannon 10**– Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (John C., “The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States”, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nie99-17d.htm>) SP

The increase in international air travel, trade, and tourism will*dramatically increase the prospects that infectious disease pathogens*such as influenza--and vectors such as mosquitoes and rodents--will spread quickly around the globe,often in less time than the incubation period of most diseases. Earlier in the decade, for example, a multidrug resistant strain of Streptococcuspneumoniae originating in Spain spread throughout the world in a matter of weeks, according to the director of WHO's infectious disease division. The cross-border movement of some 2 million people each day, including 1 million between developed and developing countries each week, and surging global trade*ensure that travel and commerce will remain key factors in the spread of infectious diseases*

Extinction

**Yu 9—**Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science (Victoria, Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate, 22 May 2009, http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate)

A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

#### Drone strikes and Special ops

Masters, Deputy Editor at the Council on Foreign Relations, 5/23/13

(Targeted Killings, [www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627](http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627))

What methods of targeted killing does the United States employ?

Drone Strikes

Targeted attacks launched from unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have ballooned under the Obama administration. A study undertaken by the New American Foundation reports that in his first two years of office, President Obama authorized nearly four times the number of strikes in Pakistan as President Bush did in his eight years. The report, which relies solely on media accounts of attacks, claims that some 291 strikes have been launched since 2009, killing somewhere between 1,299 and 2,264 militants, as of January 2013. Alternate reports also document the escalation in drone strikes in recent years, but the accounting of militant and civilian deaths can vary widely depending on the source. Traditionally the CIA has managed the bulk of U.S. drone operations outside recognized war zones, such as in Pakistan, while the Defense Department (DOD) has commanded operations in established theaters of conflict, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. But in some instances, the drone operations of both the CIA and DOD are integrated, as in the covert drone campaign in Yemen. In early 2013, the Obama administration shifted some of the CIA's authority over lethal drone operations to the Defense Department in an effort to streamline counterterrorism operations and increase transparency, analysts say.

Kill/Capture Missions

Since President Obama assumed office, the Pentagon has also increased the use of special operations raids (aka kill/capture missions) from 675 covert raids in 2009 to roughly 2,200 in 2011. According to the Pentagon, approximately 90 percent of these night raids end without a shot fired. As conventional U.S. forces begin to drawdown, "the role of counterterrorism operations, and in particular these kinds of special missions, will become prominent," says ISAF commander General John Allen. The covert raids are directed by an elite element within the U.S. military known as Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). The clandestine command draws top personnel from groups like the Navy SEALs and Army Delta Force, and maintains a direct relationship with the executive branch. JSOC has tripled in size since 9/11 and currently operates in a dozen countries. Jeremy Scahill of The Nation writes, "The primacy of JSOC within the Obama administration's foreign policy--from Yemen and Somalia to Afghanistan and Pakistan--indicates that he has doubled down on the Bush-era policy of targeted assassination as a staple of U.S. foreign policy." Civilians and local governments have condemned night raids as culturally offensive, given that U.S. soldiers often enter homes in the dead of night, with women present, and utilize dogs (which are viewed as impure in Muslim culture) in their search. In April 2012, the United States reached a seminal agreement with Afghanistan to give Kabul greater oversight over special operations raids and put Afghan forces in the lead of those activities.

#### Offensive cyber operations must disrupt or damage information in computers & networks or the computers & networks themselves

Washington Post – 8/30/13, Barton Gellman and Ellen Nakashima, U.S. spy agencies mounted 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011, documents show, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231-offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011-documents-show/2013/08/30/d090a6ae-119e-11e3-b4cb-fd7ce041d814_story.html>

The scope and scale of offensive operations represent an evolution in policy, which in the past sought to preserve an international norm against acts of aggression in cyberspace, in part because U.S. economic and military power depend so heavily on computers. “The policy debate has moved so that offensive options are more prominent now,” said former deputy defense secretary William J. Lynn III, who has not seen the budget document and was speaking generally. “I think there’s more of a case made now that offensive cyberoptions can be an important element in deterring certain adversaries.” Of the 231 offensive operations conducted in 2011, the budget said, nearly three-quarters were against top-priority targets, which former officials say includes adversaries such as Iran, Russia, China and North Korea and activities such as nuclear proliferation. The document provided few other details about the operations. Stuxnet, a computer worm reportedly developed by the United States and Israel that destroyed Iranian nuclear centrifuges in attacks in 2009 and 2010, is often cited as the most dramatic use of a cyberweapon. Experts said no other known cyberattacks carried out by the United States match the physical damage inflicted in that case. U.S. agencies define offensive cyber-operations as activities intended “to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers or computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves,” according to a presidential directive issued in October 2012. Most offensive operations have immediate effects only on data or the proper functioning of an adversary’s machine: slowing its network connection, filling its screen with static or scrambling the results of basic calculations. Any of those could have powerful effects if they caused an adversary to botch the timing of an attack, lose control of a computer or miscalculate locations.

#### The War Powers Resolution applies to the phrase “introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities” – it’s a legal term of art. The legislative history and legal interpretation of the WPR is the authoritative source on what armed forces means in the context of war powers.

Chesney 8/29/13, Law Professor at UT and Senior Fellow at Brookings

Robert, “The War Powers Resolution and Using Force in Syria,” Lawfare Blog, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/the-war-powers-resolution-and-using-force-in-syria/

So, any problems here? Probably not. The WPR does not define what counts as sufficient “consultation,” which pretty much ensures that arguments on that score are unlikely to go anywhere. At any rate, we are told the White House “is set to provide a briefing for bipartisan members of the Congressional leadership as well as the top ranking members of the national security committees on Thursday.” The White House surely will take the position that this is adequate to discharge any WPR consultation requirement that may apply here. Others will argue this not enough, but neither the WPR’s text nor past practice gives much basis for insisting upon broader outreach or a more different kind of outreach.¶ Of course, this only matters if you have “armed forces” introduced into existing or imminent “hostilities.” And that brings us to a second issue, one that received a lot of attention in connection with the war in Libya a few years ago (see here for a collection of Lawfare posts exploring that debate in 2011). Harold Koh famously (or infamously, depending on who you ask) argued to Congress in the summer of 2011 that U.S. involvement in Libya did not amount to involvement in hostilities, as a matter of statutory interpretation, because (i) “hostilities” is an ambiguous term the meaning of which is determined in significant part by past practice under the WPR, (ii) the meaning must be determined with reference to the specific facts of a given situation, and (iii) in the Libya example of host of limiting considerations—including the limited scope of the mission, the limited exposure of US forces to attack, the limited risk of escalation, and the limited array of combat capabilities involved—combined to keep the U.S. role under the threshold of hostilities. I assume that the administration will embrace the same position here, and if the eventual strike on Syria amounts to a barrage or two of cruise missiles and nothing more, it will seem to fit within that mold. Of course, that mold was soundly criticized at the time, and no doubt will be again…. [Note: A colleague wrote in, after reading this post, to raise the possibility that Koh might have given a different answer at an earlier stage of the operation in Libya when manned US aircraft were involved in airstrikes; re-reading Koh's testimony with that in mind, I can't foreclose the possibility, but it's not clear to me either way frankly]¶ 2. The Notification Requirement under Section 4¶ Section 4 of the WPR gives the President 48 hours to provide a written report to key Congressional leaders if US forces are put into certain triggering situations, including (i) deployment into actual or imminent hostilities, or (ii) regardless of the imminence of hostilities, the forces are deployed into foreign territory, airspace, or waters while equipped for combat (excluding supply/repair/training missions).¶ Would either be triggered by an attack? I covered the “hostilities” argument above, so let’s focus on the combat-equipped deployment test. If we are talking about manned [staffed] aircraft entering Syrian airspace, or anyone else’s airspace, in order to bomb, this one looks satisfied. If instead we are talking only about sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)—i.e., nothing in foreign territory but weaponry, as opposed to human beings—it’s a bit trickier. Perhaps one could argue that the missile itself is not “United States Armed Forces.”¶ But at any rate, this is all academic. It is inconceivable that the administration would launch an SLCM barrage or manned airstrikes without soon providing Congress with a formal notification of that fact, no doubt accompanied by language that the notification is provided “consistent with” the WPR.¶ So what really is at stake with the Notification Requirement of Section 4? Read on.¶ 3. The 60/90 day Withdrawal Clock under Section 5¶ The notification requirement sometimes matters a lot simply because it is the starting gun for the 60/90 day “clock” under WPR Section 5. But it won’t likely matter at all in this instance, for two reasons.¶ First, section 5 provides that the President must withdraw forces 60 days after the written notification under Section 4 (or after an additional 30 days if the President certifies in writing that safety requires the additional time to complete the withdrawal), unless Congress in the interim expressly authorizes the deployment. Or, rather, it says all this has to happen if the notification under Section 4 had to be filed due to satisfaction of the “hostilities” test; the clock does not start when the notification instead is triggered by the combat-ready deployment test. And so, once again, the definition of “hostilities” is the key. If one accepts the likely administration position that one-off airstrikes don’t count as WPR “hostilities,” the withdrawal clock never starts running.¶ The second reason that the withdrawal clock won’t matter is much simpler: if the attack involves a 24 or 48 hour period of airstrikes, and nothing more, the intervention will be over long before the clock can run. Only if we become entangled will this begin to matter, at which point the weight will fall on the credibility of claiming that we are not deployed into “hostilities.”

#### Congress

Eric Lorber – January 2013, EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science, JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vol. 15:3 , https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013

An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized “armed forces” as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term “armed forces” revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution’s architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central Intelligence Agency).184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback,185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of “armed forces” centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones,186 suggesting that Congress conceptualized “armed forces” to mean U.S. combat troops.

#### The President

JULIA L. CHEN – November 2012, Boston College Law Review, NOTE: RESTORING CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE: ACCOMMODATING THE EVOLUTION OF WAR, 53 B.C. L. Rev 1767

Harold Koh, a legal advisor to the U.S. Department of State, explained the administration's legal position on war powers. n261 The American military activity in Libya was limited largely to providing intelligence and refueling for NATO allies. n262 The administration's view was that in cases like this when the military engages in a "limited military [\*1794] mission that involves limited exposure for U.S. troops and limited risk of serious escalation and employs limited military means," the "hostilities" are not covered by the Resolution. n263

Mr. Koh, like Senator Kerry, differentiated the action from those envisioned by the drafters of the War Powers Resolution. n264 Unlike previous administrations, the Obama administration did not challenge the constitutionality of the Resolution. n265 Rather, it argued that the Resolution was drafted to "play a particular role," and that to "play that role effectively in this century" the Resolution would require modification. n266 The Resolution regulates "the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities." n267 As Mr. Koh explained, the Resolution does not address the situation of "unmanned uses of weapons that can deliver huge volumes of violence," such as UAVs. n268 Thus the administration claimed that there was a large hole in the Resolution for combat activities employing unmanned weaponry. n269